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ABSTRACT
EFFICIENT HARDWARE PRIMITIVES FOR
SECURING LIGHTWEIGHT SYSTEMS
FEBRUARY 2020
SIVA NISHOK DHANUSKODI
B.E., ANNA UNIVERSITY - MADRAS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Daniel E. Holcomb
In the era of IoT and ubiquitous computing, the collection and communication
of sensitive data is increasingly being handled by lightweight Integrated Circuits. Ef-
ficient hardware implementations of crytographic primitives for resource constrained
applications have become critical, especially block ciphers which perform fundamental
operations such as encryption, decryption, and even hashing. We study the efficiency
of block ciphers under different implementation styles. For low latency applications
that use unrolled block cipher implementations, we design a glitch filter to reduce
energy consumption. For lightweight applications, we design a novel architecture for
the widely used AES cipher. The design eliminates inefficiencies in data movement
and clock activity, thereby significantly improving energy efficiency over state-of-the-
art architectures. Apart from efficiency, vulnerability to implementation attacks are
a concern, which we mitigate by our randomization capable lightweight AES archi-
tecture. We fabricate our designs in a commercial 16nm FinFET technology and
vi
present measured testchip data on energy consumption and side channel resistance.
Finally, we address the problem of supply chain security by using image processing
techniques to extract fingerprints from surface texture of plastic IC packages for IC
authentication and counterfeit prevention. Collectively these works present efficient
and cost effective solutions to secure lightweight systems.
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INTRODUCTION
Advances in the chip industry have enabled, at the time of this thesis, production
of Integrated Circuits (ICs) with transistor channel lengths as small as a few nanome-
ters. Miniaturization has opened avenues for ultra-lightweight systems such as the
Internet-of-Things (IoT). Some of the multi-billion dollar [115] applications of IoT
include smart homes and cities, operations and equipment optimization in factories,
wearable/implantable medical devices and autonomous vehicles.
Ubiquitous computing often involves sharing personal and confidential data over
the Internet. As a result security of IoT devices becomes important especially in
critical applications like healthcare. Some of the unique challenges in IoT security
include limited hardware resources, stringent power budgets, and cost constraints.
Lightweight IoT devices like Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags and wireless
sensor nodes are typically battery powered with energy budgets of less than a micro-
joule per bit of data processed [115]. Physically accessibility of these devices to an
attacker opens a variety of security threats, both passive and active attacks.
The basic security services required of a cryptosystem are confidentiality, integrity,
message authentication and nonrepudiation [87]. Block ciphers form an important
building block in offering these services. Symmetric key encryption algorithms encrypt
and authenticate data using a secret key. Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
is the most widely used symmetric key based block cipher. Dedicated hardware
implementations of AES are used in millions of hardware chips worldwide to encrypt
large blocks of data with better performance and power than can be achieved in
software implementations.
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Implementing cryptographic primitives such as AES for IoT systems is challenging
due to cost constraints and power budgets. Designers exploit the symmetry in the
operations of the AES algorithm to reduce the number of hardware units implemented
and reuse them over time to save area. However block ciphers have data dependencies
which these make lightweight implementations inefficient as a significant amount of
energy is spent in moving data around to work around the dependencies.
Apart from efficiency concerns, AES can be vulnerable to Side Channel Attacks
(SCAs) that target weaknesses of the hardware implementation to extract the secret
key. Passive SCAs exploit correlation between computed data and the power con-
sumption of hardware implementing AES to retrieve the secret key. Active attacks
inject a fault in the AES computation and retrieve the secret key by comparing the
outputs of faulty and faulty-free computations. Lightweight devices for IoT are espe-
cially susceptible to SCAs as they have low background noise power, are physically
accessible to the attacker, and have low budget for defenses.
Besides the implementation weaknesses, the supply and distribution channels of
ICs present a large, diverse and vulnerable attack surface. Counterfeit ICs such as
phony parts, recycled, and remarked chips have made their way into critical defense
and avionics systems. With ubiquitous computing, the problem of counterfeit parts
becomes increasingly critical. IoT systems are often combining chips from different
sources, and a single bad chip can compromise the entire system.
In this dissertation, we present a background to further understand some of the
aforementioned problems, then provide novel and efficient solutions. The dissertation
ranges on topics from silicon to package, covering the entire stack of a hardware sys-
tem. We study the reasons for energy inefficiencies in state-of-the-art block ciphers
and design micro-architectures that greatly mitigate inefficiencies under different sce-
narios. We support our claims with data from a testchip in an advanced commercial
16nm FinFET technology. We also present a novel IC authentication technique that
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uses computer vision techniques to prevent counterfeits and can be deployed atop
current infrastructure at almost no cost.
My specific contributions include:
• Developed glitch filtering techniques that allow partially and fully unrolled block
ciphers to have an energy efficiency that is competitive with serialized imple-
mentations
• Designed a novel microarchitecture for lightweight AES implementations that
minimizes data movement and clock activity to improve energy efficiency
• Enabled randomization of sub-round operations in lightweight AES architecture
to mitigate side channel susceptibility
• Taped out AES designs in a commercial 16nm FinFET technology chip and
tested efficiency and side channel resilience of the designs
• For the first time, showed that individual chip packages can be recognized and
authenticated using intrinsic surface features extracted using low cost cameras
and image processing
The remainder of the dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 1 provides
the necessary background about block ciphers, side channel attacks and supply chain
security. Efficiency of unrolled block ciphers is addressed in chapter 2 through a new
glitch filter design (published in Trans. on Computers 2017 [30]) enabling unrolled
ciphers to be competitive with serialized designs but with the drawback of significant
area costs. We next explore a novel lightweight AES architecture with side channel
resilience in chapter 3. Our design significantly outperforms state-of-the-art and we
published our work in ISLPED 2017 [32] and ISVLSI 2019 [31]. We further taped
out our designs in 16nm FinFET technology and chapter 4 describes the design and
evaluation of our testchip containing four AES designs. In chapter 5 we discuss our
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novel IC package authentication methodology to verify provenance of ICs. We present
concluding remarks in chapter 6.
4
CHAPTER 1
BACKGROUND
1.1 Block ciphers
Block ciphers are cryptographic primitives that encrypt and decrypt data, typi-
cally within a larger encryption mode of operation to help achieve security goals of
confidentiality and authenticity for a cryptosystem. Block ciphers can also be used as
part of hash functions. Typically, a block cipher algorithm iterates over a round func-
tion for a specified number of times using different round keys generated by the key
schedule function. Substitution and permutation are two common operations found
in the round functions of block ciphers. Symmetric key block ciphers such as DES
and AES are used for data encryption due to their simple design and performance.
Asymmetric algorithms such as RSA and ECC employ complex mathematical opera-
tions and are therefore used for key exchange and digital signatures. Now we describe
the block ciphers AES and SIMON, as we will be using them in this thesis.
1.1.1 AES
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a ubiquitous encryption standard [91]
based on the Rijndael cipher. It was standardized by NIST in 2001 to replace DES
following an open competition. AES uses a number of iterated rounds, 10 in the
case of a 128-bit key strength, to transform a block of plaintext into a corresponding
block of ciphertext. Each round (Fig. 1.1) operates on 128 bits of state, and uses
a 128-bit round key to generate the next state from the current state. The major
components of the round function are SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns, and ad-
dition of the round key. The SubBytes function uses an S-Box circuit to apply the
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Figure 1.1: Structure of AES round function.
same byte-wise substitution function to each of the 16 state bytes. ShiftRows oper-
ation reorders the bytes. MixColumns operates on a 4-byte input {s3, s2, s1, s0} and
produces a 4-byte output {m3,m2,m1,m0} as per Eq. 1.1. Finally the round key
is added (XORed) to the output of MixColumns to create the next state that will
be used as the input to the next round. The 128-bit round keys are expanded from
a single 128-bit key input as shown in Fig. 1.2. Round key 0 is the input key and
RC[i] = xi−1mod(x8 + x4 + x3 + x+ 1) is the Round Constant of round i.

m0
m1
m2
m3

=

2 3 1 1
1 2 3 1
1 1 2 3
3 1 1 2


s0
s1
s2
s3

(1.1)
1.1.2 SIMON
SIMON is a lightweight Feistel cipher suitable for resource constrained systems,
and we use the SIMON-128 variant [13]. SIMON-128 uses a 128-bit key, 128-bit data,
and requires 68 rounds for each encryption. A Feistel structure is symmetric in nature
and offers the advantage of similarities in the encryption and decryption operations,
which in turn reduces the required resources for a hardware implementation. The
round function (Fig. 1.3a) is constructed to be extremely small in hardware and easy
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Figure 1.2: Structure of AES 128-bit Key Expansion [87].
to serialize without sacrificing software performance [13]. It consists of only the fol-
lowing operations: bitwise XOR, bitwise AND and left circular shift Sj by j bits. The
round key ki is generated from the input key according to the key schedule operation
shown in Fig. 1.3b. The operations in the key schedule are similar to the ones in
the round function. To eliminate vulnerabilities to cryptanalysis attacks such as slide
attack [18] that exploits cyclic nature of key schedule and rotational attacks that
exploit correlations between bit-rotated pairs of inputs [62], a 1-bit round constant
is employed in each round of the key schedule from the following 62-period sequence
z2 = 62
′b 10101111011100000011010010011000101000010001111110010110110011.
1.2 Energy efficiency in block ciphers implementations
Block ciphers are almost always implemented as components of a larger overall
system-on-chip design, and this prevents the block cipher from being freely optimized
independently of the other SoC components. For example, the block cipher will have
to use the same fabrication process and supply voltage as the other components,
and typically will share a common clock frequency to avoid clock generation and
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(a) Round Function (b) Key Schedule
Figure 1.3: SIMON round function and key schedule [13].
clock domain crossing. Therefore, any attempt at optimizing block ciphers may be
constrained by these chip-scale implementation decisions.
Depending on the chip-scale requirements and constraints, the block cipher rounds
can be implemented through sequential reuse of a single combinational block for each
round, or they can be unrolled. If a design is serialized (no unrolling), one round
function is computed in each clock cycle, and the number of cycles needed to encrypt
a block is the same as the number of rounds in the block cipher algorithm. Yet at slow
clock frequencies, the clock period may far exceed the critical path delay of a block
cipher round. The latency of the block-cipher is then being increased unnecessarily
due to the serialization of the round function. Unrolling has been explored in literature
as a technique to instantiate multiple round functions per clock cycle and eliminate
energy spent in loop control elements such as registers and multiplexers. However
the energy savings are minimal and are offset by the increase in glitching power that
comes with unrolling; we further explore this in Ch. 2.
For resource constrained applications like IoT, lightweight implementations of
block ciphers have been explored. Symmetry in sub-round operations has been lever-
aged by temporal reuse of limited hardware units to save area in ciphers such as AES
[78, 47]. For example, if a single AES S-box (Fig. 1.1) is implemented in hardware
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it can be reused to operate on different bytes across clock cycles. In this case one
round is completed in 16 cycles. The increase in latency due to narrow datapath
operation is acceptable in these non-performance critical applications. However, sig-
nificant energy inefficiencies exist due to the storage of intermediate results and data
movement which are explored and addressed in Ch. 3. Though lightweight ciphers
such as SIMON have been proposed they are not used as extensively as AES.
1.3 Side Channel Attacks
Although encryption algorithms and protocols have been developed to provide
security, hardware implementations can leak valuable information to an attacker. For
example, data dependence in power consumption of a device can be exploited as a
side-channel to extract its secret key. Such a security attack is termed a Side Channel
Attack (SCA). Some examples of passive side-channels include encryption time, power
consumption or electromagnetic radiation emanating from device that are correlated
to the computed data [104]. Active attacks on the other hand inject faults into the
computation by varying supply voltage, clock frequency, or exposing the device to
lasers, and subsequently analyze faulty and fault-free outputs to retrieve the secret
key [57, 104]. Combined active and passive attacks also exist [95].
1.3.1 Differential Power Analysis and metrics
Power side-channel attacks such as Simple Power Analysis (SPA) [64], Differential
Power Analysis (DPA) [64] and Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) [22] leverage data
dependency in power consumption to extract secret information. In a DPA attack, one
would capture power traces T0, T1, ... Tm−1 while the encryption algorithm is running
and record the corresponding ciphertexts C0, C1, ... Cm−1. An internal node value b
in the computation that is dependent on a few bits of round key and ciphertext is
then chosen as a selection function. In AES, the attack is performed on values that
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depend on only a single byte of round key at a time. Now the attacker guesses the key
bits, and for each guess Ks he partitions the power traces T0, T1, ... Tm−1 based on the
computed value of the selection function D(Ci, b,Ks). The attacker then computes
a differential trace ∆D as shown in Eq. 1.2. For the correct key guess, with enough
power measurements a peak in the differential trace is observed at the time when
the selection function is computed in hardware, due to the correlation between the
predicted selection function and the differential average of power traces (∆D). For
incorrect key guesses, a random partitioning of power traces results in a differential
average that approaches zero with enough measurements.
∆D[j] =
∑m
i=1D(Ci, b,Ks)Ti[j]∑m
i=1D(Ci, b,Ks)
−
∑m
i=1(1−D(Ci, b,Ks))Ti[j]∑m
i=1(1−D(Ci, b,Ks))
(1.2)
For example in a DPA attack on AES, by making power measurements the secret
key of AES in a smart card is broken by using S-box input value as selection function.
The attack works despite not being able to observe the S-box inputs. In Fig. 1.4a the
differential power trace values for different key guesses are plotted. The correct key
guess (green line) has a higher DPA peak than incorrect key guesses (red lines). With
enough measurements only the correct key guess has a consistently high DPA peak
as seen in Fig. 1.4b. Measurements to Disclosure (MTD) [107] is the number of
measurements required to distinguish the correct key guess from incorrect ones. MTD
is defined as the cross-over point between the differential peak of the correct key guess
and the maximum differential peak of all the wrong key guesses. In Fig. 1.4b we see
an MTD of about 13K encryptions. Even though we demonstrate DPA with AES,
side-channel attacks can also break insecure implementations of other cryptographic
algorithms such as RSA and DES [63].
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Figure 1.4: Illustration of a DPA attack on AES.
1.3.2 Existing countermeasures
A number of circuit-level countermeasures exist for side-channels. Circuit-level
countermeasures are imperfect but can drastically decrease the signal-to-noise ratio of
the information leaked through the side channel. One family of countermeasures tries
to modify the power delivery system so that the power consumed by the encryption
circuit will not be externally visible to the attacker. Switched-capacitor designs can
isolate the sensitive computation from main power by sourcing its current from a
capacitor and then discharging the capacitor to a fixed value before replenishing
it [108]. On-chip low-dropout regulators [100] can also be used to obscure the power
consumption of the sensitive circuit.
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A second family of circuit-level countermeasures are modified logic styles that try
to achieve a power consumption that is independent of the values being computed.
SABL and WDDL [105] are differential logic styles that always compute both true
and complement values of each node so that power consumption is unrelated to the
computed value; these logic styles require careful routing to balance the loading on
the differential signals, but given enough measurements can still be attacked due
to unavoidable small imbalances in the differential routing [107]. Masked dual-rail
precharge logics seek to avoid routing constraints by using a random mask to reduce
correlation between power consumption and processed data [90, 89], but are costly in
area.
Another approach to preventing side channel attacks, which can be complementary
to circuit-level countermeasures, is hiding the timing of the computation from the
attacker. An attacker that does not know when a certain key byte is processed will
have difficulty aligning the power traces in the way that is required for DPA attacks.
Timing randomization can easily be accomplished by inserting idle delays, but idle
delays can be identified in the power trace and removed by the attacker. Randomly
inserting dummy encryptions or dummy rounds between meaningful computations
adds a delay that cannot easily be detected and removed in post-processing, but
consumes significant power and latency and requires added complexity around the
cipher. We further explore efficient timing randomization in Sec. 3.2.
1.3.3 Logic State Based Leakage Power Analysis
Side-channel attacks have primarily focused on dynamic power as it has typically
been assumed to be the main contributor of the power consumption. However with
today’s technology scaling, leakage power has become a significant contributor as well.
While the countermeasures such as WDDL, SABL mitigate the information leakage
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Table 1.1: Simulated Dynamic and static power consumption of a WDDL-AND gate.
Input State
Absolute currents Normalized to state 00
Dynamic (µA) Static (µA) Dynamic Static
00 9.83 0.174 1.00 1.00
01 9.80 0.231 1.00 1.33
10 9.73 0.206 0.99 1.18
11 9.82 0.238 1.00 1.37
through dynamic power consumption, the secret data can still be vulnerable through
the analysis of leakage power.
Leakage Power Analysis (LPA) attacks are relatively new and have not been as
thoroughly explored as dynamic power attacks. The overall leakage power of a cryp-
tographic core is related to the secret data [43] and DPA techniques can be applied
to leakage power in the presence of process variations [70]. Effectiveness of a Ham-
ming Weight based LPA attack on cryptographic cores has been studied for various
side-channel resistant logic styles in the presence of noise and process variations [6].
WDDL and other side-channel resistant logic styles offer resistance against dy-
namic power attacks. However, WDDL still has a significant data dependence in the
static (leakage) power consumption (Tab. 1.1). Dynamic power can be made arbi-
trarily balanced (using SABL for instance) but static power cannot. We leverage the
data dependence of static power to predict the total leakage power consumed by a
circuit and from this extract secret information such as cryptographic keys. We name
our scheme Logic state based Leakage Power Analysis (LLPA) [33].
We assume the attacker has knowledge of the circuit’s implementation (in terms of
logic gates) and is able to observe primary outputs and measure power consumption.
Note that our assumption that an attacker knows the exact gates implemented inside
of a design is increasingly a very practical assumption, as this technique has been
employed in security research [86, 101], and one can even purchase this information
commercially through companies such as Chipworks. Even if a design uses camou-
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Figure 1.5: Schematics for LLPA.
flaged gates [92], the functionality of gates can often be extracted [77, 71]. Also,
note that the internal state is unobservable in the attack model and is predicted with
design knowledge and known data inputs.
To demonstrate our methodology, we choose to attack in simulation a 6x4 S-box
used in DES and retrieve the secret key. The schematic of our circuit is shown in
Fig. 1.5b. The static current of each gate type for every gate input combination
is obtained in a pre-characterization step. For each data input the attacker guesses
the key value Kj and computes the logical input state of each gate in the design.
Under a key guess, state dependent static currents of all gates are summed up to
compute a predicted static power Pj for the entire design. This is repeated for all
key guesses j = 0, 1, ... 63 and the correlation Cj between static power predictions Pj
and measurement M is computed per Eq. 1.3. With enough measurements only the
correct key guess should have a consistently high correlation value. Fig. 1.6 shows a
successful attack with an MTD of 1071 measurements.
Cj = ρM,Pj =
covariance(M,Pj)
σMσPj
(1.3)
1.3.4 Remote Side Channel Attack on FPGAs
As part of my thesis, I collaborated with students from the Reconfigurable Com-
puting Group at UMass to investigate a remote side channel attack on FPGAs which
I describe in this section. The FPGA implementations described in this section were
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Figure 1.6: A successful attack using LLPA.
done by my colleagues. I was responsible for developing the attack methodology and
related software code. This work was published in 2018 [93].
Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are quickly growing in importance in
a variety of computing spaces including cloud computing and embedded platforms
(automotive, military, and aerospace). As FPGAs grow in size and complexity, it
is apparent that numerous applications from independent users may simultaneously
reside in a single FPGA device. This use of multi-tenant FPGAs opens the door to nu-
merous potential attack vectors on unsuspecting co-located FPGA circuits. Although
FPGA devices in cloud computing environments such as Microsoft Catapult [4] and
Amazon EC2 F1 [1] are currently dedicated to a specific application, the growing
capabilities of FPGAs makes it easy to envision single-FPGA platforms containing
multiple independent applications created by completely separate entities.
The discovery of a covert communication channel between neighboring FPGA long
wires (also called ”long lines”) has the potential to dramatically change the threat
level of multi-tenant FPGAs. In a comprehensive set of experiments, Giechaskiel et
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Figure 1.7: FDPA Attack setup
al. [42] showed that the logic value carried on a long wire influences the delay of both
its immediate neighbor and a long wire in the same channel two wires away. When a
logic 1 value is carried on a wire (the transmitter), the delay in the neighboring wire
(the receiver) is reduced relative to when a logic 0 is transmitted. We leverage this
information leakage by implementing a Ring Oscillator (RO) near a long wire (the
victim), and use a binary counter to measure the RO’s frequency: we increment a
32-bit count value at every positive edge of RO clock for a fixed time duration. The
count values will depend on the data being transmitted on the victim wire.
Our Frequency DPA (FDPA) attack draws inspiration from DPA. As an example,
we demonstrate the working of FDPA on AES to retrieve the secret key. The relevant
portion of the AES final round circuit for attacking a key byte, using information
leaked from a single wire, is shown in Fig. 1.7. Recall that the final round of the AES
algorithm performs bytewise substitution (S-Box), shift rows, and key addition using
XOR, but it omits the mix columns operation. The output of the final round is the
ciphertext, which is public information. To set up the attack scenario for recovering
a key byte, the attacker chooses as the victim any bit of S-Box input that is routed
on a long wire; in Fig. 1.7, bit 0 of the S-Box input is chosen as the victim. The ring
oscillator is then routed next to this signal so that its oscillation count in each clock
cycle will depend slightly on the value of the S-Box input bit.
Using the ring oscillator as a sensor, the attacker monitors many encryptions to
collect information for the side channel attack. For each of n encryptions performed,
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the attacker records the ciphertext byte and the ring oscillator count during the
cycle the ciphertext byte was produced; we denote these two quantities as cti and ri
respectively for the ith encryption. After n encryptions, the attacker has a collection of
measured oscillator count and ciphertext pairings (r0, ct0), (r1, ct1), . . . , (rn−1, ctn−1).
Among the 256 possible key byte values, the attacker correctly identifies the key byte
used in the circuit based on side channel measurements as follows. For each key guess
kj (i.e. k0 . . . k255), the attacker computes an S-Box input value bi,j for each of the
i ∈ [0, n − 1] measurements using Eq. 1.4 to invert the circuit’s round key addition
and S-Box computation.
bi,j = S
−1 (cti ⊕ kj) (1.4)
By inverting the S-Box function under key guess kj, the attacker now knows what
S-Box input value would have induced ciphertext cti if the key byte was in fact kj.
For key guess kj, the computed values at the S-Box input in the n encryptions would
be denoted b0,j, b1,j, . . . , bn−1,j. The predicted S-Box inputs each contain a specific
prediction on the value of the victim wire (bit 0 of the S-Box input), and we check for
its effect on the oscillator counts to know whether kj is the correct key byte value. The
attacker next partitions the n measurements into two subsets according to whether
the victim wire would have a 0 or 1 value under the key guess kj – one subset contains
all the measured RO counts (ri) for encryptions when the victim would have a 1 value,
and the other subset contains all the measured RO counts when the victim would have
a 0 value. The attacker then uses the average RO counts of the two subsets to confirm
or refute his guess that kj is the key byte value as follows:
• If the key byte is in reality kj, then partitioning according to key guess kj
is accurately partitioning the data based on whether the victim is 0 or 1. The
average RO count will tend to be higher in the subset of encryptions that predict
a 1-value for the victim wire, and lower in the subset of encryptions that predict
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a 0-value. Observing a sufficient difference between the average RO counts in
the two subsets confirms that the partition is meaningful, and thus supports
the hypothesis that the correct key byte value is kj.
• If the key byte is not in reality kj, then partitioning according to key guess
kj is arbitrary and not correlated to the computation of the circuit. Because
the partition is arbitrary, each subset will contain a similar proportion of RO
counts taken when the victim wire is 0 and 1. In this case, the average RO
count from each subset will be similar, and the difference between the average
RO counts of the two sets will approach 0 with enough data. Observing no
difference between the average RO counts of the two subsets therefore serves to
refute the hypothesis that the key byte value is kj.
Fig. 1.8a shows graphically how a collection of RO counts can confirm or refute
a key guess. The attacker in this case collects 500 RO counts and corresponding
ciphertexts; the RO counts for the measurements are shown in the top plot of Fig. 1.8a.
The middle plot shows which of the counts are predicted, according to the correct key
guess, to occur when the victim wire is 1 and 0. We can see that, in measurements
when the key guess predicts the victim wire to have a 1 value, the RO counts tend to
be higher. The significant difference in average RO counts gives an attacker confidence
that the key guess is correct. The lower plot of Fig. 1.8a uses an incorrect key guess
to predict the 1 and 0 values of the victim wire. Using this key guess there is no
difference between the average RO counts, indicating to an attacker that the key
guess is not the correct one. Using this approach, with enough side channel data, the
attacker will be able to identify the correct key byte guesses, even when the difference
between the average RO counts is quite small. Successful attacks were performed on
different FPGAs at clock frequencies upto 10MHz and the MTDs are shown in Fig.
1.8b.
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Figure 1.8: FDPA in action.
1.4 Supply Chain Security
ICs take on critical roles in today’s society, but the supply and distribution chan-
nels for ICs are vulnerable to a variety of security threats. One such threat is counter-
feit parts, which are a significant and increasing threat to the reliability of electronic
systems. Counterfeits are defined by the US Department of Defense as “unauthorized
copies and previously used parts that are made to look new, and are sold as new” [94].
Misrepresented ICs such as speed binned parts that are remarked to a higher speed
grade to increase selling price [88] can also be considered counterfeits. Prior research
claims that recycled and remarked chips together make up 80% of all counterfeiting
incidents [45]. These types of counterfeit parts are enabled by a lack of traceability
through distribution channels as parts change hands through resellers and system in-
tegrators. DARPA notes that chain-of-custody solutions are unworkable for securing
distribution due to components that may change hands 15 times before final instal-
lation [67]. Our work addresses this critical security problem by giving an approach
for securing parts through distribution without chain-of-custody.
Estimates variously place the direct losses from electronics counterfeiting at $3B-
$7.5B [55], and the potential risk due to counterfeiting at $100B-$200B [88, 84]. The
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most commonly counterfeited electronics are said to be analog ICs, microprocessors,
memories, programmable logic, and discrete transistors [52, 45]. Documented cases of
counterfeit parts include purported microcontrollers that were found to be remarked
voltage regulators [103], four instances of counterfeit parts in the Avionics Systems of
C-27J aircraft [98], and refurbished flash memory devices in Terminal High-Altitude
Area Defense (THAAD) mission computers that led to a recall of 50 systems [94].
Counterfeit parts such as these present clear security risks which we address in Ch.
5.
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CHAPTER 2
EFFICIENCY IN UNROLLED BLOCK CIPHERS
Unrolling a block cipher is the process of instantiating multiple rounds of the al-
gorithm combinationally to be completed within each clock cycle. Unrolling allows
the result to be computed in fewer cycles at the cost of increased area of the combi-
national circuit. Unrolling also saves some amount of register energy, as energy is not
spent storing signals at the output of each round like the fully serialized case. The
unrolling of block ciphers as an energy optimization technique has been explored in
a number of recent works [58, 11]. Switching power, especially due to glitches, is a
challenge in unrolled implementations of a block cipher. In this chapter we present
an efficient latch-based glitch filter for unrolled designs that reduces energy per en-
cryption by an order of magnitude over a straightforward unrolled implementation,
and by 28-45% over the best existing glitch filtering schemes. We explore the optimal
number of glitch filters to use for minimizing total energy, and provide estimates of
the area cost. Power gating to reduce leakage power and reuse of computed key en-
able unrolled designs to be more efficient than serialized ones. We demonstrate our
approach on the SIMON-128 and AES-128 block ciphers.
2.1 Glitches and glitch filtering
The limiting factor in energy minimization of block ciphers is switching energy.
This is especially true in unrolled block ciphers because combinational logic glitches
at the input of each round diffuse through the round to cause more glitches at the
output of the round. Leakage power is small relative to switching power for typical
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clock periods and technologies used in low power designs [58]. Fundamentally, glitches
occur because of mismatched arrival times of gate inputs. This causes the gate output
to switch once when the first input arrives, and then switch again when the next input
arrives. These two switching events then propagate to many other nodes and cause
more switching events in a cascading fashion.
Several techniques to filter glitches have been proposed in literature. Pipelin-
ing [19, 114] stops glitches because they cannot propagate through a register, as a
register can change its output value only once per clock cycle upon arrival of the
clock transition. Gate-freezing [14] stalls the computation in a gate by using an
NMOS footer transistor to filter 1-to-0 transitions. The stalled gate is allowed to
compute only when its inputs have reached their final state. The scheme has a limi-
tation in that it allows 0-to-1 transitions to pass through a stalled gate. Retiming [81]
by moving or adding flip-flops in the datapath to high activity nodes that have a large
fanout can reduce glitches and save power. Yet another approach is delay balancing
to equalize input arrival times at a gate and reduce the number of output switching
events [66, 51].
An AND gate based glitch filtering scheme (Round Gating) has recently been
proposed in [9]. The output signals of each round in this scheme are gated by AND
gates that wait on an enable signal. The enable signal is derived from a delayed clock
such that it goes high to propagate the round outputs through the AND gates only
after they have stopped glitching and become stable. A drawback of this scheme is
that the enable signals must be reset low between the end of one computation and the
start of the next in order to stop propagation of the glitches in the next operation.
When the enable signals go low, waves of 0s propagate forward from the glitch filters
and through the circuit to charge and discharge the nodes in the round functions
similar to a normal computation of the round function. Effectively, resetting the
glitch filters is thus causing a second, unnecessary, power-wasting computation to
22
occur. State-retaining barriers [83] provide a mechanism for preventing this power-
wasting computation. The use of state-retaining elements is effective for reducing
glitching in FPGAs [69, 27, 35].
2.2 Checkpointing to improve energy efficiency
Combinational checkpointing is a microarchitectural technique to increase energy
efficiency in a combinational circuit by filtering glitches. We propose a new standard-
cell compatible glitch filtering mechanism [29, 30] as shown in Fig. 2.1. The topology
is similar to that of round gating using AND gates [9], except that the glitch filtering
element consists of a positive latch implemented using a multiplexer (MUX) at the
output of the round function. The purpose of the filter is to make sure that any
glitching activity from its input is not propagated to its output.
The operation of the filter is as follows. The MUX holds on to its previous output
value when the enable (select) signal is low, and becomes transparent when enable
is high. This causes the latch to be transparent only during the enable pulse. The
enable pulse is generated at the rising edge of the clock as the AND of the clock signal
and a delayed inverted version of clock. The enable pulse is propagated to the glitch
filters combinationally with timing controlled by adding a delay element per round
function. If the propagation delay of the delay element (td) is greater than the critical
delay of a round function (tr), then round output ri stabilizes before the rising edge
of signal eni, so the latches only become transparent after the glitching has stopped.
Therefore, when this timing condition (td > tr) is satisfied, glitches generated in
round i do not propagate through the glitch filters to round i+ 1. Because the latch
stays open for the duration of the enable pulse, the circuit will function correctly as
long as the round outputs stabilize before the falling edge of eni, but the circuit will
not filter any glitches that arrive when the latch is open, and the glitch filter will not
have the intended effect.
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The timing waveform for a single round of SIMON-128 is shown in Fig. 2.2. When
the enable signal pulses at the first glitch filter, the stable outputs of round i − 1
propagate through round i and cause a total of 122 transitions on the 128 round
output signals. The round outputs wait for the enable signal to arrive at the second
glitch filter, and upon its arrival, only 60 transitions occur on the inputs of round
i+1; these 60 transitions are single transitions on 60 of the 128 signals, which is close
to the expected number of bits that would differ between two uncorrelated 128-bit
signals. In this case, the filter has prevented all the spurious glitches from propagating
across rounds.
The propagation delay of the round function (tr) can be determined through static
timing analysis, and propagation delay of the delay element (td) can be configured
to exceed tr by a conservative 20% margin. This timing margin provides resilience
against PVT variations and ensures that the enable signal always arrives after the
round computation is complete. If the enable pulse arrives at a checkpoint before the
round computation has completed, glitches will propagate through the open latch, but
the computation can still be functionally correct as long as the round outputs stabilize
before the falling edge of the enable pulse closes the latch. Correct functionality
requires tr < td + w, where w is the enable pulse width, and glitch free operation
requires tr < td. Therefore, a more aggressive td can be chosen by widening the
enable pulse to tolerate variations as illustrated in Fig. 2.3. Widening the enable
pulse allows performance improvements by paying a small (glitching) energy cost,
and can be useful if only a few instances of the round function are slow due to process
variations. The enable pulses can be made very wide as the input to a round function
does not change until the next clock cycle, and the enable pulses can even be delayed
versions of the clock signal.
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2.3 Evaluation of Checkpointing
2.3.1 Methodology
We use the SIMON and AES block ciphers to study the effectiveness of our glitch
filtering scheme. SIMON is a lightweight Feistel cipher suitable for resource con-
strained systems, and we use SIMON-128 [13], which has a 128-bit key, 128-bit block
size, and requires 68 rounds for each encryption. AES refers to three standardized
variants [91] of the Rijndael cipher, based on a substitution-permutation network.
Relative to SIMON, AES is a more complicated design, and we specifically use the
widely used variant, AES-128; which has 128-bit block size, a 128-bit key, and re-
quires 10 rounds per encryption. The RTL for both designs are written by us and
validated for correctness against software implementations. To give an idea of the rel-
ative scales of the two ciphers, the round and key functions of fully unrolled SIMON
require around 30,000 gates, whereas the round and key functions of fully unrolled
AES are 4 times larger, requiring around 122,000 gates.
All of the measurements presented in this section are from simulation. Specifically,
we simulate designs with 45nm NCSU PDK [2] implemented using CMOS logic style.
Synopsys Design Compiler and HSIM are used for synthesis and circuit simulation,
respectively. We rely on circuit simulation rather than power simulations using char-
acterized libraries to ensure that glitch propagation effects are accurately captured.
Given the time consuming nature of circuit simulation on large designs, which takes
several days per encryption for the unrolled AES design, we simulate only two en-
cryptions per design, using inputs that are chosen at random. The first encryption
initializes the circuit state, and the second encryption is used for measuring metrics
described below. The accuracy of our results should not be compromised by the small
number of encryptions simulated because a block cipher’s behavior is fairly indepen-
dent of the input value used. In support of this claim, the energy consumption of
partially unrolled (17 rounds) SIMON for 100 random input vectors is shown in Fig.
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Figure 2.4: SIMON-128 energy per encryption histogram for 100 random inputs.
2.4. The variation in energy consumption is small (σ = 0.032pJ/bit) for the chosen
input vectors.
Metrics such as toggle rate and energy consumption are measured during the
circuit simulation and used to compare our scheme’s performance with others. Toggle
rate is measured as the average number of signal transitions at round outputs per
encryption. For example, in SIMON-128 a round output has 128 signals. We compute
the total number of signal transitions in all 128 signals that occur during an encryption
operation, and divide by bit-width (128) to get the toggle rate. We present energy
numbers using a metric of energy-per-encrypted bit denoted as Eenc, which is the
total energy consumed to perform an encryption operation divided by the number of
encrypted bits generated during the operation. When considering individual rounds
of the block cipher, we use as a metric the contribution of that round to the overall
Eenc. In our experiments, clock frequencies are chosen such that idle time is minimal,
and are above 10MHz in all cases.
2.3.2 Comparison of Average Switching Rates
We first study the effectiveness of the proposed glitch filter by counting switching
events on a fully unrolled implementation of SIMON-128. Fig. 2.5 compares signal
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toggle rates (signal transitions/encryption) for the outputs of all 68 rounds of SIMON.
In the ideal case of no glitching activity, at the round outputs one can expect 0.5
transitions per signal for each encryption, as round outputs are uncorrelated across
encryptions.
When no glitch filtering is used (baseline design), the switching activity is observed
to increase linearly with logic depth (number of rounds). This increase in switching
occurs because the logic of the block cipher tends not to mask transitions as they
propagate, and because the diffusion property of block ciphers tends to propagate
each transition out to many nodes. Our finding of linear increase is consistent with
observations made in previous works [10]. For each encryption in the baseline design,
the average switching across all rounds is 14.16 transitions per signal, and in the later
rounds it is 2x larger than this average.
We analyze the effectiveness of checkpointing and two other techniques that miti-
gate switching. Compared to baseline, the Round Gating scheme [9] achieves a much
lower average switching of 1.79 transitions per signal. Also, the switching activ-
ity stays fairly constant across rounds because glitches are never propagated across
round boundaries. However as noted in Sec. 2.1, resetting the AND gates every clock
cycle leads to unnecessary switching activity. Our checkpointing scheme has no such
resetting and is therefore able to reduce switching to 0.95 transitions per signal, a
47% reduction relative to Round Gating. For comparison purposes, we implement
SIMON-128 also using WDDL logic style [106]. WDDL is a dual-rail precharge based
logic that is glitch free by design. To mitigate power side channel leakages, every
signal pair in WDDL always has exactly 2 transitions per encryption; specifically,
among the true and complementary representations of each signal, it is always the
case that exactly one representation goes through a 1-0 transition during precharge
and a subsequent 0-1 transition during evaluation.
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(a) Toggle rate (b) Zoomed in
Figure 2.5: Comparison of the average toggle rate of the output signals of each round
of SIMON-128 for four different implementation styles.
2.3.3 Energy Comparison in Fully Unrolled Designs
The significant reduction in average switching rates implies that glitch filtering
can reduce the overall energy used for encryption. In this section we study the
energy savings achieved by using checkpointing to filter glitches in fully unrolled
implementations of SIMON-128 and AES-128.
2.3.3.1 SIMON-128
The energy use of each of the 68 rounds in the fully unrolled SIMON-128 imple-
mentation is plotted in Fig. 2.6 for the baseline (no glitch filter) design and three
glitch filtering schemes. The energy trends across rounds are similar to the toggle
rate trends shown in Fig. 2.5. The total energy per encryption (Eenc) including all of
the rounds is given in Tab. 2.1 and is broken down by function to show where the en-
ergy is being used. A fully-unrolled implementation with checkpointing (4.46pJ/bit)
is more efficient than fully unrolled baseline (25.91pJ/bit) because it greatly reduces
the amount of energy spent on switching in the data and key rounds, and this sav-
ings is considerably larger than the energy spent to implement the checkpoints. In
comparison to Round Gating [9], checkpointing consumes 27.9% lower Eenc. The
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Figure 2.6: Contribution of each round to the overall energy per encrypted bit in four
different implementation styles of fully unrolled SIMON-128
savings comes from a 47% reduction in toggle rate which leads to a 44.6% reduction
in data and key computation energy specifically, while the costs of other components
are similar across the two schemes. Note that WDDL and Round Gating schemes
have similar toggle rates, yet WDDL consumes 2.4x more energy because it uses only
positive gates, and therefore requires approximately 3x more gates to implement the
same function.
Fig. 2.7a shows the breakdown of energy consumption per encryption for the
checkpointing scheme. As can be seen in the figure, the switching energy does not
increase across rounds, because each round similarly starts its computation from a
single switching event. However, as was noted in Tab. 2.1, the glitch filters themselves
consume about 50% of the total energy relative to the extremely simple combinational
round function of SIMON. Hence, there is a possibility that using fewer glitch filters
might reduce Eenc further if the glitches do not increase significantly. We explore
this in Sec. 2.3.4. It can also be noted that the simple delay line that propagates
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Table 2.1: Breakdown of Eenc (pJ/bit) in fully unrolled SIMON-128. Glitch filters
are added after every round in Round Gating and our checkpointing work
SIMON-128 Baseline Round Gating Checkpointing WDDL
Data 16.37 1.90 1.07 6.95
Key 9.42 1.62 0.88 7.42
Glitch Filter – 2.36 2.20 –
Delay Line – 0.18 0.19 –
Other 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.45
Total 25.91 6.19 4.46 14.82
the enable is not costly in energy, as it is a single inverter chain relative to a 128-bit
wide computation path. The delay line does not require any tuning if care is taken
by adding some margin (buffers) to ensure td > tr (Fig. 2.2) even in the presence of
process variation.
2.3.3.2 AES-128
We repeat the energy analysis of checkpointing for the larger design, the fully un-
rolled implementation of AES-128. The energy breakdown per encryption in Fig. 2.7b
shows that glitches are filtered effectively as there is no significant increase in switch-
ing energy with logic depth (round number). The energy cost of glitch filtering is
small compared to that of actual computation. Note that the last round in AES
is simpler, and therefore consumes less energy. The energy breakdown summary is
tabulated in Tab. 2.2. Our scheme consumes an Eenc of 2.16 pJ/bit, which is 4.6x
lower than fully unrolled baseline and 45.6% lower than Round Gating. These sav-
ings directly come from a lower switching activity. Unlike the extremely simple round
functions of SIMON, AES round and key functions constitute more than 80% of the
total energy. As a result, in comparison to Round Gating our scheme saves more
energy in AES-128 (45.6%) than in SIMON-128 (27.9%).
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Table 2.2: Breakdown of Eenc (pJ/bit) in fully unrolled AES-128. Glitch filters are
added after every round in Round Gating and our checkpointing work
AES-128 Baseline Round Gating Checkpointing
Data 7.97 2.83 1.44
Key 1.83 0.76 0.36
Glitch Filter – 0.30 0.26
Delay Line – 0.02 0.04
Other 0.05 0.05 0.07
Total 9.85 3.97 2.16
(a) SIMON (b) AES
Figure 2.7: Energy/encryption breakdown in fully unrolled implementations using
checkpointing after every round.
2.3.4 Optimal Placement of Checkpoints for Glitch Filtering
In this section we explore the optimal number of glitch filters that should be used
to minimize the total energy consumption. Energy optimal glitch filtering requires
finding the right trade-off between the cost of glitch filtering and the energy saved
by filtering glitches. If too many filters are used, then the cost of the filters them-
selves will dominate; but if too few filters are used, then the cost of the glitches will
dominate. Fig. 2.8 shows how each round contributes to the energy per encrypted bit
when different numbers of rounds are implemented between the checkpoints. When
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checkpoints are added after every round (spacing = 1) in fully unrolled SIMON-128
(Fig. 2.8a), more energy is spent in glitch filtering than is spent in actual computa-
tion. However, if checkpointing is done every other round (spacing = 2), the average
energy per round is decreased because the reduction in glitch filtering energy is larger
than the increase in switching energy of the key and data rounds. Increasing the
spacing beyond 2 further reduces the cost of glitch filtering but the glitches increase
the key and data energy by a larger amount and the total energy increases. Therefore
a spacing of 2 rounds between checkpoints is optimal for SIMON-128.
The energy breakdown of Eenc for each round of the fully unrolled SIMON-128
with optimal glitch filter placement is shown in Fig. 2.9. Checkpoints are added after
every second round - the even rounds have more glitching, and only the even rounds
spend energy on checkpointing. At the optimal spacing of 2, the design consumes
4.18pJ/bit per encryption which is 6.3% lower than the 4.46pJ/bit when checkpointing
is applied after every round (Tab. 2.1). In addition, the area will be reduced because
of the fewer checkpoints. Any block cipher implementation will have some optimal
tradeoff of checkpointing energy versus glitching, but the specifics are of course design
and technology dependent.
Fig. 2.8b shows that in AES, the much larger round function justifies adding glitch
filtering after every round. Therefore, checkpoints are added at all round boundaries
in AES-128. Our design uses the Decode-Switch-Encode S-box implementation [17],
which by design is not prone to glitching, so it is likely the energy penalty of go-
ing from 1 round spacing to 2 round spacing might be greater if a different S-box
implementation were used.
2.3.5 Checkpointing in Partially Unrolled Designs
Partially unrolled designs, which implement some number of rounds combination-
ally, offer a tradeoff between area and latency of encryption. Aside from this tradeoff,
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(a) SIMON (b) AES
Figure 2.8: Energy efficiency varies with the spacing between checkpoints in fully
unrolled designs. Performing more computation between checkpoints reduces check-
pointing energy, but allows more data switching to occur
partial unrolling may also be desirable due to design constraints (area, clock period)
which do not allow for a fully unrolled implementation. Since the optimal spacing of
checkpoints is a low number (every round for AES-128, and every second round for
SIMON-128), it is beneficial to use checkpointing even for partially unrolled designs.
2.3.5.1 SIMON-128
Tab. 2.3 shows the energy per encryption numbers for different partially unrolled
implementations of SIMON-128. Glitching causes the energy of the baseline design to
increase with the degree of unrolling up to 25.91 pJ/bit for the fully unrolled design.
The energy savings offered by checkpointing also increase with unrolling up to 84%
in the fully unrolled case. Checkpointing allows for a deeper unrolling while keeping
the energy efficiency nearly constant. In comparison to the most efficient baseline
implementation (4-unrolled, 2.89pJ/bit, 17-cycle latency), checkpointing enables 34-
unrolled design (3.41pJ/bit, 2-cycle latency) to be competitive in energy at a much
lower latency. Unrolling the design further (68-unrollings) helps save some loop con-
trol energy but incurs significant leakage cost, leading to a less efficient design (4.18
pJ/bit).
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Figure 2.9: Energy breakdown of Eenc for each round in fully unrolled SIMON-128 in
the optimal configuration of checkpointing every second round.
The 1-unrolled baseline design consumes more energy than the 2-unrolled and 4-
unrolled baselines because the SIMON key expansion function requires storing keyi−2
in additional registers to compute keyi if no unrolling were done [13]. The frequencies
in Tab. 2.3 are chosen conservatively to account for process variations, but the design
could be optimized for performance.
2.3.5.2 AES-128
Similar results for different partially unrolled implementations of AES-128 are
tabulated in Tab. 2.4. The fully serialized Baseline (1.79pJ/bit) is the most energy
efficient design. In comparison, checkpointing allows unrolled implementations to
be competitive in energy while offering latency improvements. For example, the 2-
unrolled checkpointed design (1.83 pJ/bit) reduces latency by a factor of 2 for a small
2.2% energy penalty with respect to the fully serialized Baseline. The cost of leakage
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Table 2.3: Eenc (pJ/bit) comparison in SIMON-128 between optimal checkpointing
and the baseline design for various degrees of unrolling.
Either
Unrolled rounds 1 2 4 17 34 68
Latency (cycles) 68 34 17 4 2 1
Baseline
Eenc (pJ/bit) 3.78 2.95 2.89 6.15 12.43 25.91
Ileak(µA) 133 134 170 417 753 1,420
Frequency (MHz) 1,667 833 417 98 49 25
Checkpointing
Eenc (pJ/bit) – – 2.92 2.99 3.41 4.18
Ileak(µA) – – 170 557 1,080 2,017
Frequency (MHz) – – 185 73 37 19
increases with unrolling depth (Tab. 2.4) resulting in energy inefficiencies. Power
gating can help in mitigating this problem as discussed in Sec. 2.3.7.
With regard to timing, unrolled designs operate at slow clock frequencies. Check-
pointing incurs a small timing penalty because of the introduction of the glitch filters
in the critical path and some timing margin to make sure the delay element is suffi-
ciently long so that the enable pulse to a glitch filter arrives after the corresponding
round output stabilizes. Though we report conservative frequency numbers in Tab.
2.4 to account for process variations, there is no requirement to double the (already
slow) clock period as in other schemes such as WDDL or Round Gating.
Our colleagues at UMass evaluated the Checkpointing scheme on Xilinx and Altera
FPGAs using unrolled implementations of SIMON and AES, and found similar energy
savings [35].
2.3.6 Area Cost of Checkpointing
Using our glitch filtering scheme does incur some area penalty as tabulated in Tab.
2.5. In terms of number of gate equivalents, the area overhead is 4.2% if checkpoints
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Table 2.4: Eenc (pJ/bit) comparison in AES-128 between optimal checkpointing and
the baseline design for various degrees of unrolling.
Either
Unrolled rounds 1 2 5 10
Latency (cycles) 10 5 2 1
Baseline
Eenc (pJ/bit) 1.79 2.84 6.16 9.85
Ileak(µA) 560 1,030 2,400 4,600
Frequency (MHz) 1,000 625 313 164
Checkpointing
Eenc (pJ/bit) – 1.83 2.06 2.16
Ileak(µA) – 1,050 2,500 4,800
Frequency (MHz) – 500 159 81
Table 2.5: Area penalty of proposed glitch filtering scheme in units of gate equiva-
lents. Even in absolute terms, the area cost of checkpointing is significantly higher in
SIMON-128 than in AES-128 because the larger number of rounds requires a larger
number of checkpoints, even though the checkpoints are only applied at every second
round.
Baseline Checkpointing Area overhead
SIMON-128 56,488 81,321 44.0%
AES-128 147,333 153,528 4.2%
are added after every round in AES-128. In the case of a lightweight block cipher like
SIMON-128 that has a very small round function and larger number of rounds, the
penalty is more pronounced. In SIMON, the area overhead is 44% if checkpoints are
placed at the energy-optimal spacing of every second round. Adding checkpoints after
every round in SIMON-128 would incur a much higher 80% area penalty in addition
to not being energy optimal.
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2.3.7 Power Gating
In unrolled designs of a block cipher, energy efficiency would be independent of
unrolling depth except for leakage, which causes a linear increase in energy with
unrolling when a design is run at its maximum frequency. Power gating idle round
blocks can help reduce leakage power consumption. The round functions can be
powered using a virtual supply, like the drain terminal of a PMOS header as shown
in Fig. 2.10a. When the header is turned ON, the round functions are connected
to the supply (VDD) and can perform normal computation. When a round is idle, it
can be turned off by simply turning off the header transistor to disconnect the power
supply. The checkpoints are not power gated and remain powered using VDD to ensure
that state is retained. This isolates the checkpoints from the round functions, and
any decay within the logic of the round functions will not cause additional power to
be drawn from the supply.
Round functions between two checkpoints constitute a Power Gated Block (PGB),
and each such block is connected to its own virtual supply with a dedicated header.
In SIMON two rounds constitute a PGB as checkpoints are inserted every second
round, whereas in AES each round is a PGB by itself as checkpoints are inserted
after every round. When the checkpoint preceding a PGB is updated with new
data, the round functions in the PGB need to be turned ON to compute on the
new data. The PGB can then be powered off after the computed data is latched on
to the checkpoint succeeding the PGB. To accomplish this, the control signal for a
PGB’s header is generated using an SR latch that is ”set” by the enable signal of the
preceding checkpoint (eni−2 in Fig. 2.10a) and ”reset” by the enable signal of the
succeeding checkpoint (eni). The SR latch outputs a one when the set signal (eni−2)
is asserted, and stays high until the reset signal (eni) is asserted. Thus a PGB is
turned ON only while it is computing on new data.
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Figure 2.10: Power gating to reduce leakage power consumption.
The header transistor is sized so that it is able to supply the peak current required
by the connected round functions. Each PGB’s header is turned ON and OFF once
per cycle, and from our experiments the energy spent in switching the header is
smaller than leakage energy saved in the round functions. This leads to a net energy
savings as seen in Fig. 2.10b, with up to 1pJ/bit being saved in the 68-unrolled case.
Energy savings on using power gating for different partially unrolled implementations
of SIMON-128 are shown in the figure.
2.3.8 Voltage Scaling
Supply voltage scaling is a well known general technique to reduce energy con-
sumption of a circuit and has been applied to block ciphers as well [20, 78]. Switching
energy reduces with supply voltage while the computation time increases. On scaling
down the supply voltage beyond a certain point, leakage energy starts to increase
and dominate the total energy consumption. Thus there is a minimum energy point
of operation - which can be a near-threshold or even a subthreshold supply voltage
depending on the design characteristics [23]. The effect of voltage scaling on Eenc
of different partially unrolled implementations of SIMON-128 is shown in Fig. 2.11.
The total energy consumption reduces with supply voltage and leakage energy (dotted
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Figure 2.11: Energy per encryption at different supply voltages in SIMON. Dotted
lines represent leakage energy.
lines) accounts for a major fraction of the total energy at low supply voltages. Re-
gardless of the degree of unrolling, voltage scaling enables encryption to be performed
at sub pJ/bit energy cost.
2.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented an efficient latch-based checkpointing mecha-
nism to reduce the energy per encryption of unrolled block cipher implementations.
We demonstrated significant energy savings (28-45%) compared to the best exist-
ing scheme for glitch filtering in unrolled block ciphers. Our scheme performs well on
block ciphers with simple round functions as in SIMON, and complex round functions
as in AES. We also showed that optimal use of glitch filters can result in energy con-
sumption that is competitive to a fully serialized implementation while maintaining
the latency advantages of an unrolled design. However unrolling comes at a significant
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area cost, so we investigate lightweight block cipher implementations in subsequent
chapters of this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 3
EFFICIENCY IN LIGHTWEIGHT AES
Unrolled implementations of block ciphers as shown in the previous chapter have
large area footprints, making them unsuitable for resource-constrained applications
like IoT. Lightweight implementations take the opposite approach where less than
a round is implemented in combinational logic. These sub-round implementations
exploit the symmetric nature of operations in the round function, and save area by
reusing fewer hardware units over time. For example in a round based implementation
of AES (Fig. 1.1) the entire round function is performed combinationally in one clock
cycle. All 16 identical S-box instances are implemented in hardware and form a major
( 75%) contributor of area. Sub-round implementations of AES perform a fraction of
a round in each clock cycle, and this allows a smaller number of S-boxes to be reused
across clock cycles thereby saving area but increasing the number of clock cycles.
Compact AES implementations often use 8-bit data paths. In such a design, a
single S-box circuit is reused 16 times per round, and therefore each round requires
at least 16 cycles to complete. 8-bit implementations of AES are less energy-efficient
than full-round implementations, and the inefficiency is mainly in the control and data
movement. Among the computations performed in a round, SubBytes operates on 8
bits, and AddRoundKey is a bitwise XOR; only MixColumns is natively performed on
32-bit inputs, but is known to have an efficient serialization [47] that takes 8-bit inputs
in four consecutive cycles. A complicating factor in sub-round AES implementations
is that the round computation produces output bytes in an order that differs from
their input order. For example, as shown in Fig. 1.1, one quarter of the round
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computation uses bytes B0, B5, B10,B15 and produces output values that will become
bytes B′0, B
′
1, B
′
2,B
′
3 for the next round. The round output bytes are produced in
sequential order if the input bytes are read in the order (B0,B5,B10,B15, B4,B9,B14,B3,
B8,B13,B2,B7, B12,B1,B6,B11); we denote this ordering as Shift Rows Order (SRO).
The reordering of bytes by the computation causes a Write After Read (WAR) hazard.
As the first Mix Column outputs B′0,B
′
1,B
′
2,B
′
3 are produced, they must be written to
a location that will not overwrite the current values of B1,B2,B3 which have not yet
been used in the current round. Since computation itself can scale down to an 8-bit
datapath, the inefficiency of 8-bit architectures arises from the costs of moving data
around and avoiding hazards. Two dominant techniques for moving data through the
computation are RAM and shift register-based schemes.
Early 8-bit AES designs [37, 56] used small RAM blocks to hold state, and control
logic to generate addresses to read and write the RAM. Because data can be written
to, and read from, arbitrary addresses, these techniques make it easy to avoid data
hazards without increasing the amount of storage available. The latency is high in
these techniques (534 and 1016 cycles per block respectively) as very little useful work
is performed in each cycle. RAM-based techniques can be low in power, but relatively
higher in energy because of the energy cost of reading and writing data to and from
RAM in each cycle.
Shift register-based datapaths improve on RAM-based datapaths and are the most
compact way to orchestrate data movement in 8-bit AES. Most of the control com-
plexity is handled implicitly by the wiring, and data bytes proceed in lockstep through
the S-box and MixColumns at appropriate times. This shift register-based approach
is employed by recent low power implementations [47, 116, 78] and shown to perform
well. Note that the shift-register implementation style causes every byte of the state
to move at least 16 times per round (e.g. 20 shifts per round in [47]), and this can
have significant energy cost which we will address in this chapter. The total latency of
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a shift register-based 8-bit AES can be as low as 160 cycles [116], which is a significant
improvement over the RAM-based scheme.
3.1 Novel architecture
In this section, we describe a clocking methodology that improves energy efficiency
of sub-round AES implementations. 8-bit architectures proposed in literature ( [78,
116]) spend a lot of energy in data movement. These architectures move data through
at least 16 registers per AES round. Our scheme uses register renaming to avoid data
hazards without having to store a duplicate copy of the state register. Further,
movement of each data byte is limited to 5 registers per round, thereby saving clock
and data energy.
3.1.1 Improved clocking
In sub-round implementations of AES, care should be taken that the state register
is not corrupted by WAR hazard as discussed earlier. Adding a shadow register file [78]
to store intermediate results solves the problem but doubles the area of state registers.
Shift register based schemes [47, 116] avoid this area penalty by storing the duplicate
copy in the shifting behavior of the datapath. However, such an approach has energy
inefficiencies due to data movement and clock load. Consider the architecture shown
in Fig. 3.1 which has a state register whose bytes are individually clocked into and out
of the registers using enable signals with a timing as shown in Fig. 3.2. The byte in
physical register Pi is passed through the Shift Rows Mux to the S-Box when enB[i]
is active. The register enable signals enB[i] are generated such that bytes are read
out in Shift Rows Order, and the round function operates on one byte per cycle. The
computed results are written back to the state register on the negative edge of the
word enable signal enW [i]. In this scheme, each byte in the state register is clocked
once per round as opposed to 16 times/round in other schemes [116]. Further, data
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Figure 3.1: Proposed 8-bit architecture
moves through 1 state register and 4 registers in the Mix Column block which is
again fewer than the 16 or more moves needed in shift register based schemes. One
may notice that the proposed architecture (Fig. 3.1) does not contain any shadow
registers. That is because a duplicate copy of the system state is not stored. WAR
hazards are addressed in the following manner. Let byte Bi be read from register
Pj for computation. Once the resulting output byte has been computed, it can be
written back to register Pj as Bi is no longer required. However, the resulting byte
is no longer byte Bi, so now the register Pj is logically renamed to ensure correct
functionality.
3.1.2 Register renaming
Let P0, P1, . . . , P15 be 16 8-bit physical registers that store the 128-bit data.
Similarly, let B0, B1, . . . , B15 be 16 8-bit logical registers, which also correspond to
data bytes. The physical registers store the AES state, and the logical registers
describe what byte is stored in each register. The correspondence between physical
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Figure 3.2: Timing of control signals for a quarter of one round. enB signals enable
bytes to be read from physical registers into the datapath S-Box, and enW signals
allow round outputs to be written back to physical registers on falling edge.
registers and logical registers changes over time, and a logical register may be found
in different physical locations in different rounds of AES. At first appearance, this
might seem to greatly complicate control flow, because a logical register required for
the AES algorithm may need to be accessed from different physical registers across
rounds. However, periodicity in register renaming results in a much simpler control
logic as discussed below.
We first present the schedule of reading and writing registers used in our scheme,
but we do not yet address the design of the control logic that generates the enable
signals to realize this schedule. Once we’ve established here which physical addresses
should be enabled in each cycle, we come back to the question of control logic in
Sec. 3.1.3.
Fig. 3.3 illustrates our scheme of logically renaming registers to avoid the WAR
hazards; each column in the figure corresponds to a physical address, and the mark-
ings in the squares denote the logical addresses contained therein during each cycle.
Initially, the logical registers are mapped to the corresponding physical registers, that
is Bi = Pi for all i. The black squares in the figure indicate when data is read from
each physical register, and the labels on those squares indicate which byte is stored in
that register at the time of the read. The blue squares indicate cycles in which bytes
of round output are written to physical registers, and the labels on the squares denote
which bytes are being written to each register. Grey squares show the time between
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writing a byte to a physical register and subsequently reading out that same byte.
White squares indicate that the byte stored in the physical register has been read,
but nothing has yet been written back. For example, in cycle 2 byte B5 is read from
register P5, computed on for two cycles and the resulting byte (B1) is written back
to P5 in cycle 5, causing the register to be renamed accordingly. Round boundaries
are indicated by thick lines (e.g. after cycle 16). Note that four bytes are written
concurrently on every fourth cycle (i.e. in cycles 5,9,13,17 and so on). By the end of
four entire rounds (64 cycles), all bytes are returned to the same physical registers in
which they started, and the pattern repeats.
Note several very important details of Fig. 3.3. First, in each round, the bytes
are read in Shift Rows Order (B0,B5,B10. . . ), although the pattern of reading from
physical addresses that realizes this order changes across rounds due to the renaming.
Second, in each round, the bytes are written in order with B0,B1,B2,B3 written first,
then the next 4 bytes 4 cycles later, and so on. This means that, aside from the
control logic that governs when each register is read and written, the remainder of
the AES computation is entirely decoupled from the renaming and clocking scheme.
The job of the control logic is then to read each of the physical registers at the times
indicated by the black squares, and to write each of the physical registers at the times
indicated by the blue squares.
At the beginning of the second round (cycles 17-21) bytes B0,B5,B10,B15, pro-
cessed in Shift Rows Order, are read from physical registers P0,P9,P2,P11. The enable
signals that control reading (writing) from (to) these physical registers are orches-
trated by a control unit (Enable Generator in Fig. 3.1) that is aware of renaming and
tracks bytes across physical registers. In the general case, in our scheme byte Bj, in
round k, is mapped to physical register Pi, where i is as shown in Eq. 3.1.
i = (j + 12k(j mod 4)) mod 16 (3.1)
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Cycle P0 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15
- B0 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 B9 B10 B11 B12 B13 B14 B15
1 B0
2 B5
3 B10
4 B15
5 B0 B4 B1 B2 B3
6 B9
7 B14
8 B3
9 B7 B4 B8 B5 B6
10 B13
11 B2
12 B7
13 B10 B11 B8 B12 B9
14 B1
15 B6
16 B11
17 B0 B13 B14 B15 B12
18 B5
19 B10
20 B15
21 B0 B2 B4 B1 B3
22 B9
23 B14
24 B3
25 B4 B6 B8 B5 B7
26 B13
27 B2
28 B7
29 B9 B11 B8 B10 B12
30 B1
31 B6
32 B11
33 B0 B13 B15 B12 B14
34 B5
35 B10
36 B15
37 B0 B4 B3 B2 B1
38 B9
39 B14
40 B3
41 B5 B4 B8 B7 B6
42 B13
43 B2
44 B7
45 B10 B9 B8 B12 B11
46 B1
47 B6
48 B11
49 B0 B15 B14 B13 B12
50 B5
51 B10
52 B15
53 B0 B1 B2 B3 B4
54 B9
55 B14
56 B3
57 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8
58 B13
59 B2
60 B7
61 B8 B9 B10 B11 B12
62 B1
63 B6
64 B11
- B12 B13 B14 B15
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Figure 3.3: Illustration of register renaming
48
Table 3.1: Physical registers to be enabled in each clock cycle
Round Cycle +0 +1 +2 +3
1 P0 P5 P10 P15
5 P4 P9 P14 P3
9 P8 P13 P2 P7
1,5,9
13 P12 P1 P6 P11
17 P0 P9 P2 P11
21 P4 P13 P6 P15
25 P8 P1 P10 P3
2,6,10
29 P12 P5 P14 P7
33 P0 P13 P10 P7
37 P4 P1 P14 P11
41 P8 P5 P2 P15
3,7
45 P12 P9 P6 P3
49 P0 P1 P2 P3
53 P4 P5 P6 P7
57 P8 P9 P10 P11
0,4,8
61 P12 P13 P14 P15
3.1.3 Implementation
In this section, we describe the implementation details of the architecture shown
in Fig. 3.1. An AES round operation consists of Shift Rows (permute bytes from
different words), substitution operation (S-box), followed by Mix Column (mix bytes
from different words) and addition of round key. All these operations operate on bytes
except the Mix Column which operates on words. The Enable Generator produces
byte enable signals (enB in Fig. 3.1) for registers that cause the AES state to be
passed through the Shift Rows MUX in Shift Rows Order during every round of
encryption. The data then goes through the S-box, and gets mixed with three other
bytes in the Mix Column block. Finally, 32 bits of the round key are added to the
data and written back to the state register. As described in the previous section,
data is written back to the register it was read from, and renaming ensures no data
hazards occur.
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Our enable generation logic allows bytes to be processed in appropriate order with-
out the typical 8-bit architectural approach of shifting data through several flip-flops
and multiplexers [54]. In our design, the outputs of the state register are multiplexed
(by the Shift Rows Multiplexer - SRM) as shown in Fig. 3.1. We use the one-hot
enB signals produced by the enable generator as select inputs to the 16:1 SRM. To
preserve Shift Rows Ordering, the control circuitry generating enB needs to enable
the physical registers in each cycle as listed in Tab. 3.1. The physical registers listed
in the table correspond to the location of the black squares in Fig. 3.3 across four
rounds. Note that each column in Tab. 3.1 can be described as a repeating pattern
with a circular shift at round boundaries. The four columns have circular shifts of 0,
1, 2, and 3 positions at the round boundaries, respectively. This observation enables
us to generate the 64 cycle pattern of control signals required for datapath orches-
tration and register renaming at the cost of just 23 single-bit registers, as discussed
below.
Fig. 3.4 shows the Enable Generator. It consists of a single byte-select shift register
and four word-select shift registers. As the name implies, the Word Select registers
collectively enable a word (32 bits) that the Mix Column block operates on over 4
cycles. The Byte Select unit enables one byte of this word per clock cycle to pass
through SRM and to use the datapath S-box (Fig. 3.1) before entering MixColumns.
Each Word Select register shifts around a single 1 value and the current position of the
1 value determines which register is enabled in the current word. The position of the 1
within each word select register only changes on every fourth clock cycle (when shift
is asserted). For example, the state of the Word Select registers shown in Fig. 3.4
causes enable signals enW [0], enW [5], enW [10] and enW [15] to be asserted for the
next four cycles. This corresponds to the start of round 1 of AES, in which the first
4 bytes are read from registers P0, P5, P10, P15. The Byte Select unit sequences the
enB signals for these registers to allow one of the 4 bytes byte per cycle to proceed
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through SRM through the S-Box and into Mix Columns. Note that this sequence of
enable signals across four cycles is the case shown in the waveforms of Fig. 3.2. At the
end of the 4th cycle rotate is asserted, the Word Select shift registers all advance by
one position, and the next word (P4, P9, P14, P3) is processed. Once a round of AES is
completed at the end of 16 cycles, the control input to the multiplexers in the Word
Select shift registers causes them to rotate, and P0, P9, P2, P11 becomes the first word
processed in the second round. This shift at the round boundary accounts for the
register renaming, as these registers are the ones that contain bytes B0,B5,B10,B15
(see cycles 17-20 of Fig. 3.3).
In this way, despite the apparent complexity of the control signals, the enable
generation circuitry comprises only 23 flops. Effectively, the scheme works because
the control logic is mimicing the AES shift rows structure, but doing so in the control
logic to avoid moving entire bytes around the datapath. Note that the flops in the
Word Select shift registers are clocked by the system clock an not a divided clock, even
though they only shift every fourth cycle. This is done to avoid having an additional
clk-to-q delay on the critical path, as would occur if the shift register used a derived
clock.
The enable signals for the Key Expansion unit (enK) are computed by treating
Word Select register WSA and Byte Select register in Fig. 3.4 as word address and
byte address respectively. enK selects each of the 16 key registers (Fig. 3.6) one per
clock cycle in sequential order.
The schematic of the round function is shown in Fig. 3.5. All registers and
data wires in the figure are 8-bits wide. The state registers are shown in red, and
are organized in four groups {P0, P4, P8, P12}, {P1, P5, P9, P13}, {P2, P6, P10, P14} and
{P3, P7, P11, P15}. The inputs of all registers in a group are tied together, but since
register Pi is clocked by negative edge of enW [i] signal, a byte is always written to
one register in a group and is ignored by the other three in the group because their
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Figure 3.4: Enable Generator
clocks do not switch. The outputs of all 16 Pi registers are connected to the S-Box
input via SRM with the byte enables enB[i] acting as the respective select signals.
During a regular round computation, a four-byte word is selected by asserting
four enW signals (Sec. 3.1.3) for a quarter of a round. enB signal then enables one
byte of the word per cycle to pass through to the S-Box. We choose Decode Switch
Encode S-box which performs one hot encoding to eliminate glitches and reduce
energy consumption [17]. However, our architecture is agnostic to the choice of S-box
and one can choose area efficient alternatives [78, 24] if desired. The S-box operation
is followed by Mix Column operation which is performed over 4 clock cycles operating
on the enabled word. We adopt the Mix Column design from [47] except that we do
not pipeline the output. Instead, 32-bits are read out of MixColumns, XORed with
32 bits of round key and written into state at once; this decision prevents stalls, saves
three register moves, and reduces clock loading. Given that enW is serving as the
clock to the 128 bits of AES state, the registers in our design switch only once per
round as opposed to once per cycle in conventional 8-bit architectures [47].
In AES with 128-bit key size, rounds 0 and 10 operate differently than the other
rounds. In our scheme, rounds 0 and 10 work as follows. In round 0, plaintext
bytes (Data in) are read sequentially and XORed with corresponding input key bytes
(Key in). To match the “word write” of the regular round, we use three registers to
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pipeline the data. These registers can be clock gated after round 0 to save energy. For
round 10, Mix Column operation is not required and we XOR the S-Box output with
8-bits of round key to output an encrypted byte Data out (Fig. 3.5). Note that since
AES operation is decoupled from renaming, encrypted bytes are output in correct
sequential order.
Each round of AES is completed in 16 cycles, leading to a latency of 160 cycles to
encrypt a block. Among all the registers in our design, only the Enable Generation
and the 32 bits of MixColumn state switch every clock cycle, which is a small percent-
age of the overall registers in the design. The state registers switch once per round
thereby reducing clock load significantly. When considering that each data byte will
be clocked through the state once and clocked 4 times through MixColumns, this
adds up to only 5 register moves per byte per round, as opposed to approximately 20
moves in conventional 8-bit architectures [47, 78].
The schematic of Key Expansion is shown in Fig. 3.6. The functionality of key
expansion is straightforward (register read/write is sequential) and interested readers
can refer to [91] for more detail. The enable signals for the key registers (enK) are
generated by the Enable Generator. These signals enable registers K0 through K15
in the same sequence one register per cycle. The key registers are similar to data
registers in that their outputs are multiplexed and they sample data on the negative
edge of enK, once per round. The byte enables used as select signals are as shown
in Fig. 3.6. Each byte i from words Ka, Kb and Kc is enabled twice, once while
computing round key, and once more while being XORed with corresponding byte in
the next successive word. Bytes from word Kd are also enabled twice - for computing
g-function and round key.
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Figure 3.7: Randomization-capable 8-bit AES architecture. Additional details of
redesigned Enable Generator and MixColumns circuits are shown in Figs. 3.9 and 3.10.
3.2 Microarchitectural Randomization
The security of the AES algorithm itself has held up against extensive scrutiny, but
can often be broken by power side channel attacks (Sec. 1.3.1). In practice, it is often
the case that an AES key can be guessed with a few thousand power measurements if
side channel countermeasures are not used. Recent works have shown that sub-round
architectures are especially susceptible to side channel attacks [100]. Randomizing
the order of processing can potentially help resolve the side channel vulnerability, but
requires architectural support as we will show. The renaming architecture from the
previous section is modified to allow for processing the bytes in a randomly chosen
order for every round (Fig. 3.7).
3.2.1 Enable Generator design for Word and Byte shuffling
The Enable Generator controls which bytes of the state register are read and
written in each cycle of computation by generating the control signals to the byte
selection mux and the state register itself. Within the Enable Generator these signals
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come from four 4-bit Word Select Registers (WSRs) and a single 4-bit Byte Select
Register (BSR). Fig. 3.9 shows the details of BSR and one 4-bit WSR. The working
of the Enable Generator without word/byte shuffling is as follows. Each WSR is
initialized to a specific one-hot value, where the position of the 1 bit selects a byte
of the state register that is used in the current word of computation; the four WSRs
together select the four bytes comprising the current word. The BSR selects in each
of the next four cycles which byte of the word is read from the state register, through
the S-Box, and into MixColumns. After four cycles the current word is written back
in-place to the state register, and a shift signal is asserted to advance the WSRs by
one position to select the four bytes of the word that is computed in the next four
cycles. The use of in-place write back to the state register avoids data hazards, but
changes the assignment of bytes to registers and necessitates register renaming for
tracking the bytes. The logical renaming of registers at the end of each round is
handled by asserting the rotate signal of each WSR, which updates the state of each
WSR in a way that accounts for the renaming. More details regarding the working
of renaming can be found in Sec. 3.1.2.
Since bytes are multiplexed into the datapath, by modifying the Enable Generator
circuit one can shuffle the order in which the four words of the round are processed.
To implement word shuffling, in each WSR the nominal rotation that happens at
the end of a round is modified to include a random offset determined by the 2-bit
word offset signal (Fig. 3.9). This effectively causes each round to use a random
choice of the word that will be processed first, and the other three words follow it in
sequence. With the word ordering shuffled, there are now four cycles of the round in
which each byte could be read from the state register and processed. For example, b0
would still be processed as the first byte of its word, but that processing might occur
in cycles 0, 4, 8, or 12 of the round depending on the value of word offset.
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Figure 3.8: Shuffled orders in which bytes can be processed in our architecture. De-
pending on the value of the word offset and byte offset, each of the 16 state bytes
could be processed in any of the 16 cycles of the round.
Ensuring that each byte can be processed in any of the 16 cycles of a round further
requires shuffling of bytes within each word in addition to the shuffling of the words.
Byte shuffling uses a similar mechanism to word shuffling. Before the start of each
round, the BSR logic gets initialized to a state determined by the 2-bit byte offset
signal (Fig. 3.9). Within the word selected by the WSRs, the BSR will therefore cause
the processing to start from a randomly chosen byte of the word. The remaining three
bytes of the word follow in sequence before the next word is processed. Thus, word
and byte level shuffling allow each data byte to be processed in any of the 16 cycles
of a round, as seen in Fig. 3.8.
3.2.2 Mix Columns design to handle permutation
Among the AES operations ShiftRows, SubBytes (S-Box) and key addition require
no changes to accommodate byte shuffling, whereas MixColumns requires modifica-
tion. The MixColumns operation is performed on 4 bytes (a word) and is sensitive
to the order of operated bytes. The function computed by MixColumns is shown
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Figure 3.9: Enable Generator for Randomized architecture (compare Fig. 3.4). Solid,
dotted and red lines indicate 4-bit, 1-bit and 2-bit signals respectively.
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Table 3.2: Table illustrates the operation of the pipelined MixColumns (see Fig. 3.10)
for two different orderings of the input bytes. At the end of the four cycles, the
same values exist in the registers for both orderings, but their locations differ. The
permutation step associates the appropriate register value to each output signal.
Bytes arrive in the order s0, s1, s2, s3 Bytes arrive in the order s1, s2, s3, s0
Cycle Reg0 Reg1 Reg2 Reg3 Reg0 Reg1 Reg2 Reg3
1 s0 s0 3s0 2s0 s1 s1 3s1 2s1
2 s1+s0 s1+3s0 3s1+2s0 2s1+s0 s2+s1 s2+3s1 3s2+2s1 2s2+s1
3 s2+s1+3s0 s2+3s1+2s0 3s2+2s1+s0 2s2+s1+s0 s3+s2+3s1 s3+3s2+2s1 3s3+2s2+s1 2s3+s2+s1
4 s3+s2+3s1+2s0 s3+3s2+2s1+s0 3s3+2s2+s1+s0 2s3+s2+s1+3s0 s0+s3+3s2+2s1 s0+3s3+2s2+s1 3s0+2s3+s2+s1 2s0+s3+s2+3s1
Out m0 m1 m2 m3 m1 m2 m3 m0
by Eq. 3.2, where si and mi represent the i
th input and output bytes respectively
of the current MixColumns word. In absence of shuffling, MixColumns can be effi-
ciently serialized using a four stage pipeline [47] in which each incoming byte is scaled
appropriately and accumulated to a four byte value (see Tab. 3.2).
Once byte shuffling is considered, the MixColumns pipeline that processes bytes
s0, s1, s2, s3 may receive these bytes in four different orders: (s0, s1, s2, s3), (s1, s2, s3, s0),
(s2, s3, s0, s1), or (s3, s0, s1, s2). If the standard MixColumns pipeline is used to process
shuffled inputs, the correct output byte values will be computed, but their positions
will be shuffled as is shown in Tab. 3.2. Our MixColumns design adds a new permu-
tation stage that unshuffles the MixColumns results before they are written to the
AES state register (Fig. 3.10).
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(3.2)
3.2.3 Sequencing of Rounds and Key Expansion
Although the sub-round computations are shuffled internally in the datapath, the
external interface to the AES module remains unshuffled, meaning that the plaintext
data is shifted into the state register in normal order, while the ciphertext data is
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Figure 3.10: MixColumns for Randomized architecture.
concurrently shifted out of the state register in normal order. Shuffling is neither
required nor possible while shifting plaintext/ciphertext as no computation is per-
formed on the data at this time. After the data is loaded, the initial key addition is
performed one (shuffled) byte at a time, and the 10 subsequent rounds of encryption
are performed using the 8-bit datapath. There is an extra one-cycle delay at the end
of each round to allow output of MixColumns to be written back to the state register
before the next round begins. The one cycle delay avoids a potential read-after-write
data hazard that can arise in shuffled operation when the same register is written at
the end of one round and read in the first cycle of the next.
Key expansion cannot easily be randomized on-the-fly because its computation
has a long chain of dependencies. Instead, the key addition which normally happens
at the end of a round before data is written back to the state register, in our design is
delayed to occur in the next round as the first step when data is read from the state
register. Delaying the key addition ensures that the required bytes of the round key
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will always be available when needed, regardless of order in which the data bytes are
processed in each round.
3.3 Evaluation
We evaluate the efficiencies of four AES architectures: (1) an ordinary round-
based 128-bit design, (2) our efficient 8-bit renaming architecture [32], (3) our 8-bit
design with randomization, and (4) state-of-the-art reference 8-bit design [116]. The
RTL for all designs are written by us and validated against an online tool. For a
fair comparison, all designs are synthesized using Synopsys Design Compiler for the
same commercial 16nm FinFET technology, and all designs use the same energy-
efficient S-Box implementation [17]. We use the nominal voltage (0.8 V) for our
experiments. In addition to energy efficiency, the designs are also evaluated for side
channel vulnerability, area, power and performance costs.
3.3.1 Efficiency and overheads
We first analyze the energy expenditure of the AES designs using Synopsys Prime-
Time power simulations. Tab. 3.3 compares the energy per encryption (fJ/bit) broken
down by different design modules (S-box, Mix Column, Key Expansion, Control) and
also by design components (CLK, Sequential, Combinational). For efficiency, it is
generally understood that no narrow datapath computation can match or exceed the
efficiency of a 128-bit datapath, because serializations perform all of the same compu-
tation, but with some additional work to orchestrate the serialized design and store
intermediate results.The 128-bit datapath, as expected, is the most energy efficient
design at 244 fJ/bit. Our implementation of the reference 8-bit design [116] consumes
1350 fJ/bit for an encryption.
Our renaming architecture at 710 fJ/bit achieves a 47% improvement over the
8-bit reference design. The energy numbers shown in Tab. 3.3 demonstrate the
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Table 3.3: Comparison of energy efficiency of four AES designs all implemented by
us in the same 16nm technology.
128-bit Ref. 8-bit renaming 8-bit Rand. 8-bit Ref.
S-box (data&key) 68 86 74 141
Mix Column 36 172 191 187
Key Expansion 52 84 80 409
Control 3 121 385 24
Energy (fJ/bit) 244 710 889 1350
CLK 38 246 325 741
Sequential 21 155 230 228
Combinational 185 309 334 381
specific benefits of using our clocking methodology. From table in comparison to 8-
bit reference, our renaming architecture consumes 32% less sequential energy because
data moves through 5 flip-flops per round instead of 20. Further, our design spends
3x smaller CLK energy. This is because all 296 flops in the reference design switch
every clock cycle. In our design 61 flops involved in Mix Column operation and enable
generation switch every cycle, while the rest (280) of the flops holding data and key
switch once per round.
Our randomization enabled 8-bit design at 889 fJ/bit uses 25% more energy-
per-bit than the renaming design. Most of the additional energy is in the control
logic which orchestrates and manages the shuffling of the data bytes, but the energy
cost of MixColumns also grows due to the added permutation stage. Note that
non-randomized reference 8-bit design consumes 1350 fJ/bit of energy, which is less
efficient than our randomized design mainly due to inefficiency in data movement.
An area comparison is presented in Tab. 3.4. The 128-bit design is obviously the
most expensive in terms of area. Our renaming design occupies 886 µm2 and incurs a
18% area penalty compared to our implementation of the reference 8-bit design [116].
This area penalty probably comes from additional multiplexers used as the control
logic (Enable Generator) area is comparable to that of reference 8-bit. Randomization
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Table 3.4: Comparison of area of four AES designs all implemented by us in the same
16nm technology.
128-bit Ref. 8-bit renaming 8-bit Rand. 8-bit Ref.
S-box (data&key) 2226 223 223 223
Mix Column 217 60 85 60
Key Expansion 216 212 213 184
Other 407 391 476 104
Area (µm2) 3066 886 1201 750
Table 3.5: Comparison of performance. Throughput obtained at 300MHz clock.
128-bit Ref.
8-bit
renaming
8-bit Rand. 8-bit Ref.
Energy (fJ/bit) 244 710 889 1350
Power (µW ) 391 77 80 146
Area (µm2) 3066 886 1201 750
Throughput (Mbps) 3491 239 187 239
Latency (cycles) 10 160 204 160
Mean MTD 9746 1492 15983 -
adds 35.5% area overhead on top of the 8-bit renaming design, as shown in Tab. 3.4.
Both 8-bit designs are significantly smaller than the 128-bit datapath, owing primarily
to their serialized use of a single S-Box instead of the 16 parallel S-Box instances
in the 128-bit datapath. The area overhead of adding randomization to the 8-bit
datapath comes primarily from designing the flexible Enable Generator and adding
a permutation stage after MixColumns to allow reordering.
Finally, our designs are competitive in performance with the reference 8-bit design
[116] as seen in Tab. 3.5. The renaming architecture offers similar throughput at
300MHz, while the randomized design has a 22% throughput degradation due to an
increased latency. The latency increase is due to several factors: additional stall cycle
at the end of each round, delayed key addition and reading out cipher text after final
key addition to prevent information leakage.
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3.3.2 Susceptibility to Side Channel Attacks
To provide a baseline comparison between the architectures, side channel at-
tacks are performed on standard CMOS implementations of the designs in absence
of other circuit-level countermeasures. Attacking baseline implementations gives a
fair comparison of the relative susceptibility of each architecture, which is important
to consider. If the architectures are strengthened by circuit-level countermeasures,
the relative side channel susceptibilities of the architectures will reflect the baseline
comparison. In the randomized design shuffling of data requires four random bits;
2 for the word offset signal that selects the ordering of the words, and 2 for the
byte offset signal that selects the ordering of the four bytes within a word. We
shuffle each round independently, and assume that the random bits that configure
the shuffling are generated by the chip’s true-random number generator or crypto-
graphically secure random number generator. Given that the shuffling bits are not
externally observable, it might be permissible to shuffle less often, but we do not
consider this.
We perform logic simulation to obtain switching activity information and subse-
quently use time-based power analysis in Synopsys PrimeTime to generate the power
traces on which the attacks are performed. The differential power analysis attack
is performed on the power traces using a program written in C++. The attack de-
ployed against the designs is a standard DPA attack, so we provide limited details
here and refer interested readers to the work of Kocher et al. [63], among others, for
a description of DPA. Per usual in DPA, we assume that the attacker knows when
the encryption begins and can use this to align the power traces. The selection func-
tion of the DPA attack is based on predicted values of an intermediate circuit node
under each key byte guess. In our experiments we use an S-Box input bit as selection
function during the final round of each encryption.
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Figure 3.11: Plots showing DPA attack on 4 key bytes for the 8-bit designs. Top plot
shows differential power traces for the 8-bit renaming design and the bottom plot
shows the same for the 8-bit randomized design. Green line corresponds to correct
key guess and red lines correspond to incorrect key guesses.
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Figure 3.12: CDF of MTD for the different designs.
Fig. 3.11 shows differential power analysis traces from the first 4 bytes of a key in
the 8-bit renaming design after 5k encryptions, and in the 8-bit randomized design
after 30k encryptions. The differential power trace under the correct key guess (green)
has peaks of higher magnitude than all incorrect key guesses (red) demonstrating a
successful attack. Despite the larger number of encryptions performed to generate
the traces, the peaks in the randomized design are less prominent.
Fig. 3.12 shows the cumulative distribution of MTD for key bytes in the three
different designs. The DPA attack is repeated with different keys to extract a total of
64 key bytes. As would be expected, the plot shows that the key bytes can be extracted
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most easily from the 8-bit renaming design. The 128-bit design is somewhat harder to
attack due to the increased noise from parallel computations. The 8-bit design with
randomization is found to be least susceptible to the side channel attack. The mean
MTD values for the 128-bit, 8-bit renaming design, and proposed 8-bit randomized
design are 9746, 1492, and 15983 respectively. This finding from simulation suggests
that randomization helps to diminish the side channel susceptibility. In particular, the
randomized 8-bit design is not more vulnerable than the 128-bit design, and requires
an order of magnitude more encryptions to break than an ordinary 8-bit design. The
randomized design is fabricated and its side channel resistance is evaluated in Ch. 4.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter, we presented a microarchitectural technique to improve energy
efficiency of 8-bit implementation of AES. Our improved clocking methodology greatly
reduces activity of data and key registers to a single update per round, which is at least
16x smaller than conventional 8-bit implementations. Register renaming eliminates
the need for additional state registers to store intermediate results and minimizes
data movement through registers, thereby saving energy. In comparison to the most
efficient conventional 8-bit implementations, we consume 47% lower energy for an
encryption operation with a 3x reduction in clock energy, while paying a 18% area
cost. Our methodology can be extended to other sub-round implementations of AES
like 32-bit. For a 32-bit implementation, energy inefficiencies in data movement and
clocking are smaller and so would be the energy savings using our scheme.
Further, we have proposed a novel microarchitectural randomization scheme for
serialized AES implementations to reduce their susceptibility to side channel attacks.
We build on the register renaming architecture to create a design that can random-
ize the order of the sub-round operations while preserving correctness of the AES
algorithm, and avoiding data hazards. In particular, the ability to randomize the
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sub-round operations is enabled by a modified Enable Generation circuit and a per-
mutation stage after MixColumns, and by rescheduling the key expansion and key
addition across round boundaries. For an overhead of 36% area and 25% energy, our
proposed architecture improves side channel resistance of the renaming design by an
order of magnitude and removes the inherent vulnerability of 8-bit architectures rel-
ative to 128-bit designs. Our technique is well suited for low power/area applications
and is an architecture that is suitable for implementing circuit-level countermeasures
as well. Benefits of microarchitectural randomization can go beyond side channel
resilience and also protect a design against targeted runtime attacks that would re-
quire an attacker to inject a fault during a specific computation. We fabricated our
AES designs in a commercial 16nm FinFET technology and evaluate our testchip as
described in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
TESTCHIP
In this chapter we describe the design methodology used to tape out our AES
designs in a commercial 16nm FinFET technology. The chip was taped out through
MOSIS in May 2018 and received back in December 2018. We also discuss our testing
methodology and measurement results from the chip. In compliance with our NDA,
we exclude reporting confidential information about the process technology in this
thesis.
4.1 Design methodology
Our design flow comprises of RTL design, synthesis to obtain a gate level design,
and physical design to generate layout. We further design a Printed Circuit Board
(PCB) to test the fabricated chips.
4.1.1 RTL design and synthesis
A block level view of our system is shown in Fig. 4.1. As mentioned in Sec. 3.3,
we implement four AES architectures: (1) an ordinary round-based 128-bit design,
(2) our efficient 8-bit renaming architecture [32], (3) our 8-bit design with random-
ization [31], and (4) state-of-the-art reference 8-bit design [116]. The control block
enables communication with all four AES design on the chip. It consists of a Finite
State Machine (FSM) that takes as input clock, reset signals, a byte of plaintext and a
byte of key per clock cycle from chip’s primary inputs. The control block uses FIFOs
to interface with the different AES designs by feeding plaintext data of appropriate
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Figure 4.1: Block level view of designs implemented on testchip.
bit width and receiving ciphertext data. The ciphertexts are then serialized as 1-bit
signals and output along with a valid bit to the chip’s primary outputs. Details of
the AES architectures are presented in Ch. 3.
RTL design is the first step of implementation. RTL for all four AES designs
are written by us and validated against an online tool. Synthesis is the process of
converting RTL specification into an optimized technology-dependent gate-level de-
sign. Synthesis tools can optimize for area, speed and power subject to constraints.
We use Synopsys Design Compiler (DC) for synthesis with a commercial 16nm Fin-
FET standard cell library for technology mapping. Given that our goal is to come
up with efficient lightweight designs, we optimize our designs for area subject to a
timing constraint of 200 MHz clock frequency. Synopsys Prime Time (PT) is used
to perform initial timing checks on the synthesized gate level netlist. PT performs
static timing analysis and exhaustively checks the design for timing violations. The
targeted clock frequency of 200MHz exceeds the I/O pad speed limitation, and we
supply the clock from off chip through I/O, so we cannot operate above 200MHz even
if the design is capable. Setup and hold timing are comfortably met by our designs
at the foundry-specified worst case corners.
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4.1.2 Physical design
Physical design is the process of creating an optimized layout for fabrication from
the gate level design. It comprises several steps: design planning, power planning,
placement and optimization, clock tree synthesis, routing and post-route optimiza-
tion, chip finishing steps, and Design Rule Checks (DRCs). We use Synopsys IC
Compiler (ICC) for physical design. Fig. 4.2 shows snapshots from different stages
of the physical design flow for the 8-bit randomized AES design.
In design planning, a floorplan of the layout is created. It defines cell boundary
and core area, and creates site rows for standard cell placement. I/O pads are placed
outside the core area. We create a rectangular floorplan with a 50% target utilization
for each of the AES designs. Due to schedule constraints we did not pursue optimiza-
tion of higher utilizations but fairness in comparing results is assured by using the
same utilization specification for all four AES architectures. Higher utilizations (such
as 70%) would further reduce footprint of each design.
Power planning ensures a design with good power integrity, and a reduction in
IR drop and electromigration. A power distribution network is created per vendor
specification. A coarse-grained grid in the top two metal layers addresses IR drop
while a fine-grained grid in the two lower metal layers addresses the di/dt requirements
of the design. The spacing between power straps in each metal layer is determined
based on current density limits of the metal layers, the design’s power requirements,
and routability. A snapshot of the created floorplan with power grid is shown in Fig.
4.2a.
Following power grid creation, cells from the post-synthesis gate level netlist are
placed in the various site rows of the floorplan core area. Legal placement of standard
cells is obtained through an iterative process while optimizing for minimum area
subject to timing constraints. Special physical only cells such as well taps to prevent
latchup current and endcaps to meet DRC requirements at layout boundaries are
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(a) Floorplan showing power grid
(b) Placed design
(c) Clock tree
(d) Routed design
Figure 4.2: Different stages of physical design of 8-bit Randomized AES.
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placed first, followed by regular logic cell placement. Placement of cells for the 8-bit
Randomized AES design is shown in Fig. 4.2b.
After placement, clock tree synthesis is performed to build the clock network that
begins at the clock source and ends at the sequential elements of the design. The clock
tree is optimized by buffer sizing/relocation to minimize clock skew between different
fanouts and also reduce clock insertion delay. Clock nets are then pre-routed before
proceeding to signal routing. The clock tree of the 8-bit Randomized AES design
containing 579 sinks is shown in Fig. 4.2c.
As part of routing and postroute optimization ICC performs global routing, track
assignment followed by detailed routing to determine the actual course of wires that
connect the placed cells. Setup and hold time for critical process corners are checked
in this step for timing closure while optimizing routes. Initial DRC checks are also
performed to ensure routing abides by design rules. Setup timing is easy to meet
due to the modest maximum frequency of the design which is limited by I/O pads.
Following the initial routing step, we perform two incremental post route optimization
steps to individually address hold time and DRC violations. Finally, we use a focal
optimization step that targets only a single violation type to fix any remaining hold
timing violations. Fig. 4.2d shows an example of a fully routed design. After timing
closure of the fully routed design in ICC, we perform standard cell filler insertion
to ensure well continuity. Sign-off timing checks using Synopsys PrimeTime passed
while sign-off DRC checks using Synopsys IC Validator (ICV) had over 100 violations.
The DRC violations were related to routing issues with I/O pins that were not on the
routing tracks. Fig. 4.4 shows some examples of the DRCs that were manually fixed.
A snapshot of the entire system’s layout containing all four AES designs and
I/O pad placement is shown in Fig. 4.3. The layout area is pad limited as seen in
the figure. Each AES design has its own isolated power network to enable accurate
power measurements. The control logic from Fig. 4.1 is placed outside the four AES
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Figure 4.3: Layout showing all four AES designs.
Figure 4.4: Examples of sign-off DRC violations on finished design that were manually
fixed.
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(a) Full chip layout. (b) Unpackaged die on a dime.
Figure 4.5: Images of full chip with other designs from colleagues on same die. All
designs have isolated power domains.
designs and has its own power network. The I/O pads are powered through a 1.8V
supply while the AES designs and control logic in the core area are powered through
individual 0.8V power supplies.
For full chip integration, designs from colleagues were also instantiated in the same
die. The I/O pads from the different designs are routed to Re-Distribution Layer
(RDL) bumps that are laid out in a 13x13 matrix over the entire die area. Synopsys
ICC was used to perform RDL routing. FEOL and BEOL fills for manufacturability,
and final DRC checks on full chip are performed using Synopsys ICV. Fig. 4.5 shows
a picture of an unpackaged die containing the AES system among others. RDL routes
are also visible in the image.
4.1.3 Chip packaging and Printed Circuit Board design
Flip Chip Ball Grid Array (FC-BGA) packaging is used to house the 2.5mm x
2.5mm fabricated die. Solder balls are laid out in a 13x13 grid at a 1mm pitch.
Fig. 4.6a shows how RDL bumps of die are connected to solder balls in the package.
Snapshots of the packaged chip are shown in Fig. 4.6b. The 168 package pins comprise:
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84 signal, 48 VDD and 36 GND pins. The four AES designs and control logic use
30 signal, 12 VDD and 8 GND pins. To test the packaged chips, we design a 4-layer
Printed Circuit Board (PCB) using Autodesk Eagle. The boardview of the PCB is
shown in Fig. 4.7a. The PCB integrates a BGA socket for testchip, an FPGA module
with testbench, level shifters, screw terminals for power supply connections, and
testpoints for side channel and energy measurements. The BGA socket (Fig. 4.7b)
allows us to test multiple chip instances using the same PCB instead of soldering
the chip directly to the board. The bottom part of the socket is mounted on the
PCB using bolts such that the Surface Mount Technology (SMT) pads of the PCB
are contacted by an elastomer guide of the socket. The packaged chip is placed in
the socket such that its solder balls make contact with the socket’s elastomer guide
which connects them electrically to the SMT pads of PCB. The top lid of the socket
is secured using a torque driver. The socket manufacturer estimates that packaged
chips can be swapped out 1000 times before the elastomer layer wears out and must
be replaced.
.
4.2 Chip Testing
In this section we present results on efficiency and side channel resilience of the
four AES designs based on measurements from the testchip. The PCB designed
for chip testing (Fig. 4.7b) houses an Artix 7 FPGA (Cmod A7 [34]) and a Flip
Chip Ball Grid Array (FCBGA) socket that holds the chip. The FPGA handles all
communication with the testchip. A MATLAB program sends plaintext data to the
testchip via FPGA and receives ciphertext data from the testchip in a similar fashion.
The received ciphertext is validated in MATLAB against a software implementation
of AES to continually check correctness of chip output. The FPGA operates at 3.3V
while the testchip uses an 0.8V core voltage and 1.8V I/O voltage. Level shifters
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(a) Illustration of flip-chip packaging [110].
(b) Images of packaged chip showing front and back side.
Figure 4.6: Chip packaged in a Flip Chip Ball Grid Array
translate voltage levels appropriately between FPGA and testchip I/O. A Keysight
Source Measure Unit B2901A [60] is used to supply power to individual AES modules
and also measure current with 100fA precision. I mentored Samuel Allen in the
summer of 2019 and would like to acknowledge his help with some aspects of test
setup and data collection.
4.2.1 Efficiency, power
Power measurements are made using the Source Measure Unit (Fig. 4.7b) by pow-
ering each AES design in isolation. Power consumption per encryption at different
clock frequencies is shown in Fig. 4.8a and the slope of the line plot (µW/MHz)
is determined for each design. The renaming architecture has a power consump-
tion of 0.42µW/MHz which is 13x lower than a 128-bit design which consumes
5.75µW/MHz. Power does not equate to efficiency because the designs have differ-
ent throughput. The metric of Mbps/µW describes efficiency of a design. It remains
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(a) PCB boardview showing isolated power domains for different components
(b) Data collection setup to perform automated measurement from testchip. BGA socket [53] houses
the chip.
Figure 4.7: AES chip test setup.
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(a) Power (µW) Vs Clock frequency (b) Efficiency (Mbps/µW)
(c) Energy-per-bit (pJ) Vs Clock frequency (d) Leakage Power (µW)
Figure 4.8: Power and energy comparison of AES designs based on testchip measure-
ments.
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Table 4.1: Performance comparison of AES designs with testchip measurements ob-
tained at 20MHz clock.
128-bit Ref. Renaming Randomized 8-bit Ref.
Energy (pJ/bit) 0.44 0.55 0.74 1.20
Power (µW ) 113.28 8.74 9.24 19.32
Throughput (Mbps) 256.00 16.00 12.54 16.00
Cell Area (µm2) 3066 886 1201 750
Die Area (µm2) 6450 1800 2400 1480
Latency (cycles) 10 160 204 160
constant as clock frequency is adjusted to increase throughput for proportionally more
dynamic power. In terms of efficiency from Fig. 4.8b, the 128-bit datapath is the most
efficient at 2.28 Mbps/µW due its to 16x higher throughput than the 8-bit designs.
The renaming architecture is competitive at 1.90 Mbps/µW and is twice as efficient
as the state-of-the-art reference 8-bit design (0.84 Mbps/µW ). Even our Randomized
architecture is more efficient at 1.42 Mbps/µW . Efficiency can also be measured in
terms of Energy-per-bit and similar trends are seen in Fig. 4.8c. Both the renaming
and randomized designs have sub-pJ/bit energy efficiencies as tabulated in Tab. 4.1.
Leakage power, measured by turning off the clock, is correlated to design area as seen
in Fig. 4.8d. The 128-bit design exhibits highest leakage power because it is about
4x larger in area than the 8-bit designs. Cell area, latency and throughput of the four
designs are tabulated in Tab. 4.1.
The efficiency of all designs can further be improved with voltage scaling and we
reassured this experimentally for the Renaming architecture. Though we did not
design for low voltage operation the testchip was functional down to 0.6V resulting
in improvements of 2x in efficiency and 33% in leakage power (Fig. 4.9).
4.2.2 Side Channel resilience
Resilience of the 8-bit AES designs to side channel attacks is analyzed by perform-
ing a Hamming Distance based DPA attack during the final round of encryption. A
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Figure 4.9: Effect of voltage scaling on efficiency.
background on DPA is given in Sec. 1.3.1. Power traces are captured by measuring
the voltage drop across a 1k supply-side resistor as illustrated in Fig. 4.11a. With our
measurement setup (Fig. 4.7b), we are able to capture 20K traces/hr using MATLAB
with Keysight MSOX4154A (700Mhz probe) oscilloscope [61] and USB data transfer.
Since bytes are processed one at a time in an 8-bit datapath, Hamming Distance
between consecutive bytes at the S-box input is chosen as the selection function to
partition the power traces (Fig. 4.11b). This selection function is meaningful because
of the side channel leakage in power consumption when a data byte (green star in
Fig. 4.11b) overwrites the previous one at S-box input.
The attacker observes the ciphertext byte ct and guesses the key byte k to com-
pute the value of byte b at S-box input. In the next clock cycle, the procedure is
repeated with the new observed ciphertext byte to compute the S-box input byte
b′ that overwrites byte b, and a Hamming Distance HD between bytes b and b′ is
computed. In this manner, power traces are aggregrated in Class1 if HD > 4 and
in Class0 if HD < 4. The differential trace is computed as the average difference
between traces in the two classes. The attacker computes a differential trace for each
key guess for the byte he wishes to attack. A peak in the differential trace indicates
a correlation between the key guess and power measurement. With enough mea-
surements the differential trace of the correct key byte guess will consistently show
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(a) 8-bit reference
(b) 8-bit renaming
(c) 8-bit randomized
Figure 4.10: Differential and DPA traces with Hamming distance leakage model.
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(a) DPA measurement (b) Leakage model
Figure 4.11: Differential Power Analysis
a higher peak than the differential traces of incorrect key byte guesses. We use the
term DPA trace of a key byte guess to denote the maximum values of the differential
traces when varying the number of encryptions used for the attack.
The differential and DPA traces at the end of 200K encryptions are shown in Fig.
4.10 for the 8-bit AES designs. All 16 key bytes are attacked and the location of
the differential trace peak varies depending on the clock cycle of the last AES round
in which a particular key byte is processed. In Fig. 4.10, a successful DPA attack is
indicated by green lines for the differential and DPA traces of the correct key; whereas
a failed attack with 200K encryptions is indicated by corresponding red lines.
• In the renaming design key bytes are processed sequentially one per clock cycle
and the peaks in differential trace also follow suit (Fig. 4.10b).
• In the randomized architecture key bytes are processed in a random order and
a particular key has equal probability to be computed in any of the 16 clock
cycles of the last AES round. This results in 16 smaller peaks in the differential
trace (Fig. 4.10c).
• The reference 8-bit design also has multiple peaks in the differential trace
(Fig. 4.10a) but for a different reason. In this architecture, data bytes pass
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Table 4.2: Measurements to Disclosure using Hamming Distance DPA on the 8-bit
AES designs
Renaming Randomized 8-bit Ref.
Mean MTD 761 118,400 1897
through register-to-register in the shift rows pipeline several times before ap-
pearing at the S-box input.
The resilience to DPA is quantified in terms of Measurements to Disclosure (MTD)
[107] - the number of measurements required to distinguish the correct key guess
from incorrect ones. MTD is defined as the cross-over point between the DPA trace
of the correct key byte guess and the maximum of DPA traces of all the wrong
key byte guesses. The DPA attack is repeated 40 times with all 16 key bytes on
the 8-bit AES designs and the average MTD values are listed in Tab. 4.2. The
renaming design is easy to break with just 761 encryptions required on average for a
successful DPA attack. The efficiency of the renaming design in eliminating unwanted
switching results in a lower background noise power and makes the design more
vulnerable to DPA. The 8-bit reference design in comparison has slightly higher MTD,
apparently due to increased noise power. The randomized design is much harder to
break (MTD > 100,000 encryptions) as the signal is spread out in time over 16 clock
cycles as was shown in Fig. 4.10c. Adding randomization capability to the renaming
design increases MTD by two orders of magnitude. While it is hard to draw absolute
conclusions, the significant increase in MTD indicates that randomization can help
slow down the attacker from retrieving the secret key.
4.3 Summary
In this chapter we presented the design methodology for taping out our AES
architectures in a commercial 16nm FinFET technology. Our automated testing
methodology enables functional verification, energy measurements and side channel
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analysis of the AES designs. In line with our simulations, the renaming architecture
exhibits 2x efficiency improvements over the state-of-the-art 8-bit reference design and
is the most efficient 8-bit AES to date to the best of our knowledge. The randomized
design shows promise to improve side channel resilience which is an important concern
with 8-bit datapaths of AES. Both of our AES designs consume sub-pJ/bit energy
making them attractive candidates for low power applications in resource constrained
scenarios. With techniques such as voltage scaling, further improvements in efficiency
can be achieved.
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CHAPTER 5
PACKAGE IDENTIFICATION
In this chapter we propose and evaluate CounterFoil, a system that uses in-
expensive cameras to check intrinsic variations in semiconductor packaging as means
of verifying IC provenance. We name our system CounterFoil both to reflect its
aim of foiling counterfeits, and because the enrollment records it uses are analogs for
counterfoils kept by issuers of cheques1.
IC manufacturing often involves off-shore foundries for fabrication, a packaging
house where the bare die is mounted within an encapsulating package, and system
integration where packaged chips are soldered onto a PCB. The supply chain for
packaged ICs can involve several distributors before the IC gets installed in a system.
Securing the supply and distribution chain of ICs is important to prevent counterfeit
parts. Besides monetary risks of billions of dollars counterfeit ICs can pose serious
security threats to critical systems in defense and healthcare as discussed in Sec. 1.4.
Some examples of counterfeit ICs are unauthorized copies (overproduction), remarked
old parts (recycling) and ICs with misrepresented speed grades.
Existing strategies for preventing counterfeits parts from being used in systems
can be broadly classified as either trying to detect anomalies, or else authenticat-
ing individual chip instances that are trusted. A common approach in counterfeit
identification is to apply a battery of tests to a part in order to evaluate whether it
1Oxford Dictionary defines counterfoil as “The part of a cheque, receipt, ticket, or other document
that is torn off and kept as a record by the person issuing it.” https://en.oxforddictionaries.
com/definition/counterfoil
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is consistent with the expectations based on known good parts. The applied tests
include physical inspection (visual [8], x-ray imaging, microblast analysis of the sur-
face, spectroscopy, ion chromatography), electrical inspections [65, 16], and checking
for aging using silicon odometers [5], ring oscillators [46], dynamic current signatures
in adders [117], or other circuits that change in a measurable way with use. If any
tests reveal an anomaly, the part can be deemed counterfeit. Anomaly detection
techniques are used as part of qualification procedures by the US Department of
Defense to minimize the risk of counterfeits, but “may not definitively distinguish
authentic parts from counterfeit parts” [97]. Machine learning and neural network
based techniques [99] detect anomalies in microscopic features to classify genuine and
counterfeit parts. Unlike these approaches our technique relies on extracting unique
fingerprints from individual parts to authenticate provenance and thereby prevent use
of counterfeits.
An alternative to anomaly detection is to identify and authenticate individual
part instances using unique or hard to clone features. If a part is trusted at one
point in time, and later a part can be validated as being the same one that was
earlier trusted, then a judgment can be made that the part is still trustworthy. Well-
known non-microchip versions of this style of object authentication include human
fingerprints [39] and anti-counterfeiting features in currency [85]. Similarly, Physi-
cal Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are a type of physical fingerprint that can be used
for authentication of parts. PUFs can be based on random delays in silicon [41],
power-up fingerprints of Static Random Access Memory [44, 49, 102], randomly scat-
tered dielectric particles in a protective coating [112], or unique Radio Frequency
emissions [28, 26], among many others.
Several existing strategies for validating provenance of microchips are implicitly
relying on the IC package as the basis for trusting the enclosed silicon die. The
DARPA SHIELD project aims to embed inside IC packaging a secure dielet that
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can be interrogated wirelessly with a smart-phone like device to validate provenance
of the part [67]. A company called Applied DNA Sciences offers a botanical DNA
taggant that can be applied to various goods including microchip packages [48] to
support traceability through distribution. To date, working with the Defense Logistics
Agency (DLA) of the US Department of Defense, the technology has marked over
700,000 microchips [79]. Both package-embedded dielets and package tagging have
an underlying assumption that an adversary cannot easily swap a microchip out of
its package, and therefore validating the package provenance suffices to validate the
provenance of enclosed microchip.
5.1 Transfer Molding for IC packaging
Transfer molding (Fig. 5.1) is the typical procedure for packaging of high-volume
integrated circuits [15, 25]. Most DIP (Dual In-line Package), SMT (Surface-Mount
Technology), and QFP (Quad Flat Package) packages are created this way, as well as
more advanced packaging styles such as system-in-package. In the transfer molding
process, each silicon die is first attached to a metal leadframe, and the pads from
the die are wire-bonded to the individual leads to create electrical connections. Each
leadframe-mounted die is then placed in a mold cavity, with the leads extending out
the side of the cavity. A plunger liquefies pucks of epoxy molding compound using
temperature and/or pressure. The liquefied compound flows through runner channels
into the mold cavity to surround the die and form the shape of the package. After
the compound solidifies, the molds are released, and the leads are separated from
the remainder of leadframe, which is discarded. The metal leads protruding from the
formed package are now the pins of the packaged chip that will connect it to a printed
circuit board. Further details on the many packaging styles for integrated circuits can
be found in a popular textbook on the topic [111].
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Figure 5.1: Transfer molding is the mechanism used for packaging most high-volume
microchips.
Several sources of variability in transfer molding can impart unique features to
a package surface. The mold has a surface roughness that gets imprinted onto the
package. The surface texture of the mold changes over time as residue material
accumulates on the mold, and molds require cleaning to mitigate this build up [50].
Additionally, the molding compound itself, and its curing, contribute a certain amount
of unpredictability. The molding compound is an epoxy that contains a number
of fillers including crushed quartz or alumina that comprise 75% or more of the
compound, and provide thermal conductivity. The size of the filler particles can range
from 20-100µm, and the orientation and distribution of filler particles in the package
is unpredictable. The package during post-mold curing also experiences shrinkage,
cracks, porosity, and voids [109]. Due to aforementioned variation sources, even chips
packaged in the same mold could have differences in their package surface.
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Figure 5.2: Protocol for package fingerprinting. Trusted enroller labels each pack-
age and then enrolls it by extracting and then signing a set of keypoints associated
with the package. Verifier compares the enrolled keypoints against the package to
determine whether the package is consistent with its label.
Algorithm 1: EnrollChip
Input: Image img of chip surface with marker attached. Private key kpr for
signing messages.
1 eid← readMarker(img)
2 feid ← extractKeypoints(img, r, θ, wenroll)
3 s(feid)← Sign(kpr, feid)
4 database[eid]← feid‖s(feid)
5 return
Algorithm 2: VerifyChip
Input: Image img of chip surface with marker attached. Public key kpub to
check signatures.
Output: Success or failure to verify chip as authentic according to the
identity on its label
1 id← readMarker(img)
2 feid‖s(feid)← database[id]
3 if V erifySignature(kpub, s(feid)) then
4 fv ← extractKeypoints(img, r, θ, wverify)
5 if score(feid, fv) > threshold then
6 return success
7 return fail
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5.2 CounterFoil anti-counterfeiting scheme
CounterFoil uses package surface features to authenticate provenance of indi-
vidual chips as shown in Fig. 5.2. The two participants in the scheme that interact
with the chip are denoted as the enroller and a verifier. The enroller acts on behalf
of a chip manufacturer that wishes to sell parts with an assurance of provenance.
The verifier is a customer that has purchased the chips on the market and wants
to check whether they are legitimate. Both the manufacturer as enroller, and cus-
tomer as verifier, have incentives for participating in the presented scheme. The
chip manufacturer can make their products more attractive by offering an assurance
that authentic parts bearing their branding can be verified as produced by them.
Importantly, they can accomplish this without needing to trust every point in their
distribution channels. The chip customer is incentivized to participate because sys-
tems that are free from counterfeit chips can avoid costly failures or recalls that are
caused by counterfeits [94].
The enroller extracts fingerprints from package surface features using image pro-
cessing and publishes information about enrolled chips to a public database. Integrity
of database entries is assured by digital signatures. The enroller holds a private key
kpr for signing messages, and gives the corresponding public key kpub to any parties
that wish to act as verifiers. Our implementation uses the simplifying assumption of
pre-existing public keys for enroller and verifier, but in practice this could, for exam-
ple, rely on a trusted certificate authority. The enroller uses the private key to sign
database entries when writing them, and the verifier uses the enroller’s corresponding
public key to check the signatures when reading from the database. More details
about the enrollment (Alg. 1) and verification (Alg. 2) procedures are given below.
Details of the image processing performed in enrollment and verification are deferred
to Sec. 5.3.
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5.2.1 Enrollment
The enrollment procedure should occur as part of the packaging of an IC. The IC
should be trusted at the time of packaging, as the goal is to later tie provenance back
to this point. Each die is sealed inside of a molded plastic package as usual by means
of transfer molding (see Sec. 5.1 and Fig. 5.1). After the package hardens and cures,
a label with a computer-readable identification marker is affixed to the surface of the
package. The marker represents an insecure numerical identifier of the chip instance,
similar to a serial number, which we denote as its eid (enrollment identifier). The
enroller then takes an image that captures both the marker, and the package surface
in the vicinity of the marker, from which the fingerprint will be extracted. A digitized
enrollment fingerprint feid is extracted from the image, using a procedure that will
be explained in Sec. 5.3.2. The date of manufacture and other metadata can be
appended to the fingerprint at this point. The enroller creates signature s(feid) by
digitally signing fingerprint feid using private key kpr (Alg. 1, line 3). An entry is
added to the public database to associate the identifier eid with feid‖s(feid) (Alg. 1,
line 4). Once the chip is enrolled to the database, it is released into distribution
channels.
5.2.2 Verification
The verification procedure checks authenticity of chips at the end of distribution.
The verifier takes an image of the chip that includes both the marker and the package
surface in the vicinity of the marker. The insecure identifier (eid) of the marker is
extracted from the image. The enrolled data feid‖s(feid) for this identifier is accessed
from the database (Alg. 2, line 2). The validity of signature s(feid) is checked using
the public key kpub of the enroller (Alg. 2, line 3). The enrolled fingerprint feid is
compared against a new fingerprint fv that is extracted from the relevant area of
the chip package surface. If the similarity score exceeds a chosen threshold, then the
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package surface is determined to match the record (Alg. 2, line 5). The chip is verified
as authentic only if the digital signature is valid, and the fingerprints match. The
validity of the signature ensures that the enrolled fingerprint in the public database
was created by the enroller and has not been modified. The fingerprint match ensures
that the enrolled data is not being used to authenticate a chip other than the one that
was enrolled, a scenario that would arise if a label was copied or transferred from one
chip to another. The verification procedure is currently performed on a workbench
in our lab, but could later, for example, be integrated into a pick-and-place machine
at the end of distribution that picks chips from reels and places them appropriately
onto printed circuit boards.
5.2.3 Attacker Capabilities and Security Considerations
The attacker considered in this work is a profit-motivated counterfeiter that forges
chips for purpose of selling them on the market. This type of profit-seeking attacker
is responsible for prior counterfeit parts found in sensitive systems, but note that it
does not include nation-state attackers that may spend large amounts of money to
create malicious forgeries to bring down targeted high-value systems. For a profit-
seeking attacker, if the effort of forging chips exceeds the selling price of the chip on
the market, there is no incentive to forge the chips. At the same time, the cost for
anti-counterfeiting technology in commodity parts cannot exceed what the producer
or consumer of the parts is willing to spend for the guarantee of provenance.
The security of our approach relies on assumptions similar to those in earlier
work on certificates of authenticity [28]. Our assumptions relate to the enrollment
and verification protocol, the uniqueness of package fingerprints, and the difficulty of
creating forged chip packages that match legitimately enrolled fingerprints. Among
these three, the first is intended to be uncontroversial, and the latter two are supported
by experimental data in the paper.
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1. Protocol Integrity: We make the standard assumption that an adversary is
not able to obtain the enroller’s private key or forge digital signatures without
having the private key. We assume that the enroller is trusted to only package
legitimate integrated circuits, and to enroll only these packages with the private
key kpr.
2. Unique Fingerprints: We rely on the fact that package fingerprints created
under ordinary conditions are unique and are identifiable via image processing.
Specifically, an enrolled fingerprint from one package will not be deemed a match
for any package other than the enrolled one. Fingerprint uniqueness binds the
enrolled data to a specific chip instance. If labels are later affixed to chips other
than the enrolled, the enrollment data associated to the label will not match
the chip characteristic. This prevents an adversary from successfully copying or
transferring labels across chips.
3. Difficulty of Package Forgery: We assume, and then support experimen-
tally, that package fingerprints are random and difficult to control. This pre-
vents an adversary from creating a new package surface that matches a legit-
imate enrolled fingerprint. We support this assumption by showing that even
chips from the same mold have different fingerprints. This implies that even
possession of an identical mold will not enable an adversary to successfully
forge packages and therefore forgery requires a more advanced manufacturing
process than what industry uses for packaging chips. Regardless of the process
used to create forgeries, an adversary will have to create recognizable features
with sizes on the order of 10µm (see Fig. 5.3). Besides attempting to clone the
package surface an attacker could print a label with features from a legitimate
chip. However, the printing task is seemingly out of reach of many technologies
such as high-end 2400 DPI printers, which have a dot size of 10.6µm and can
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only print reliable features at a much larger scale than its dot size. Aside from
forgery, an adversary might transfer the package from a legitimate part to a
counterfeit IC, but there would be no profit motive to this, as it would destroy
a legitimate chip to create a single forged chip.
8µm
-8µm
0µm
4µm
-4µm
(a) Package surface profiled using Zygo Nexview [118]
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(b) Extracted feature sizes from image processing.
Figure 5.3: Size of features extracted from images of package surfaces using OpenCV
implementation of ORB algorithm as discussed in Sec. 5.3.2
Note that an adversary could make a chip unverifiable by simply removing or
irreparably damaging its label. We view this as a reliability concern more than
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a security concern, as counterfeiters would not earn profit by disabling the trust-
enhancing technology from legitimate parts. Nonetheless, the paper labels we use
in our prototype system would likely be replaced by a more robust marking when
deploying CounterFoil at production scale.
5.3 Image Processing and Analysis
Our system relies on image processing as part of enrollment and verification. En-
rollment generates a digitized representation of recognizable features within a selected
area of the package surface. Verification later scores the record of enrolled features
against a new image of the package surface. In this section we describe the computer
vision algorithms used. Our algorithms are written in C++ using OpenCV [21] for
the image processing.
5.3.1 Aruco marker labels and detection of ROI
Our system uses computer-readable labels (Fig. 5.2) to represent the purported
identity of a package. We also use the labels as fiducial marks to determine the Region
Of Interest (ROI) in an image used for both enrollment and verification. It is to be
noted that one could choose to use the entire image for enrollment/verification but this
would increase runtime as discussed in Sec. 5.4. Aruco, the specific marker system that
we use, is a square-based fiducial marker system with binary codes [40]. Aruco marker
dictionaries are configurable, allowing for an arbitrary marker capacity (in bits) and
number of markers. We use Aruco markers to label the chips with the search tag
of the public database. The four corners of the marker allow for detection of image
orientation (pose estimation) which we leverage to determine the ROI for further
processing. Fig. 5.4 shows a detected marker with its top-left corner used to determine
the center of ROI at a distance < r, θ > relative to the marker. Depending on
whether the image is being processed for enrollment or verification, the ROI selected
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Figure 5.4: Image of chip with affixed marker. The position of enrollment ROI is
shown by the blue box, and the callout shows the keypoints extracted from the ROI.
The ROI that would be used for verification is the smaller red box. The size and
position of both ROIs are defined relative to the marker, as shown by annotations in
yellow.
from the image would be either ROIenroll (blue square) and ROIverify (red square).
Both squares are centered at the same point, and have a size that is defined relative
to the marker size for magnification invariance. The width of the larger square is
wenroll = 2mm, and the width of the smaller square is wverify = wenroll/
√
2. The
difference in ROI sizes ensures that the ROI from enrollment will always contain the
ROI from verification regardless of rotation. Consider the yellow circle in Fig. 5.4
which is centered at point < r, θ >. Regardless of the image orientation, the red
square will always be contained within the circle, and the blue square will always
contain the circle. Therefore, the blue square (ROIenroll) will always contain the
red square (ROIverify). Further, ROIenroll is chosen larger than ROIverify to save
runtime, as the verification involves more processing steps than enrollment. In our
experiments we use r = 5mm and θ = pi/8.
5.3.2 Feature Enrollment
The enrollment process extracts distinctive features from an image which are suit-
able for matching and object recognition, and stores them as compact feature descrip-
tors. A number of well-known image processing techniques exist for feature detection
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and description, such as Scale Invariant Feature Transform (SIFT) [72], Oriented
FAST and Rotated BRIEF (ORB) [96], Binary Robust Invariant Scalable Keypoints
(BRISK) [68], and Speeded-Up Robust Features (SURF) [12]. These techniques are
commonly used in applications such as image stitching, where image alignment re-
quires finding corresponding points of objects in two different images that contain
the objects. Our work is agnostic to the choice of algorithm, but based on empirical
evaluation (as will be discussed in Sec. 5.4.4) we choose ORB.
We first pre-process the image (ROI) using Contrast Limited Adaptive Histogram
Equalization (CLAHE) to improve the contrast and tolerance to variation in lighting
intensity. We then use OpenCV’s implementation of ORB to extract image fea-
tures. The keypoints are detected by Oriented FAST algorithm and described by
256-dimensional rotated BRIEF descriptors [96]. Similarity between two keypoints
can be evaluated using feature distance, which is the Euclidean distance between two
keypoints in the 256-dimensional feature space. The keypoints also have associated
positions within an image, and we will use pixel distance to denote the Euclidean
distance in two dimensions between pixels in an image. For the sake of predictable
runtime, we restrict the number of keypoints to 1,000/mm2 of package surface. Fig.
5.4 shows the keypoints extracted from the region of interest.
The enrolled features are stored in a public database along with a digital signature
(Fig. 5.2). The NIST Digital Signature Standard (DSS) establishes three algorithms
for signatures, RSA, Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve DSA
(ECDSA) [59]. We choose DSA in our implementation, but this can replaced by either
of the other algorithms with minimal performance impact. For hashing function,
SHA-3 is chosen because it is the latest Cryptographic Hash Standard issued by
NIST [36]. More specifically, the enrollment data is hashed using SHA3-256 and
subsequently signed with the enroller’s private key using an implementation of DSA
with 3072-bit private key as from the open-source Crypto++ library [3].
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5.3.3 Feature Verification
Verification compares the enrolled keypoints against the ROI of a new image in to
order compute a similarity score. The integrity of enrolled keypoints is first verified by
checking the digital signature. When a new image is captured for verification, its ROI
is identified relative to the marker, and keypoints are extracted from the ROI. This
mirrors the corresponding steps performed in feature enrollment, so we don’t repeat
their description here. The processing performed with the verification keypoints is as
follows.
5.3.3.1 Feature matching and RANSAC based homography computation
Two images of the same planar surface taken from different perspectives are re-
lated by a homography, which is a geometric model that maps feature positions in
one image to the corresponding positions in the second image. Estimating the ho-
mography requires finding enrollment and verification keypoints that are similar and
therefore likely to be representations of the same feature on the package surface. We
find such points by performing nearest neighbor matching using Open CV FLANN
(Fast Library for Approximate Nearest Neighbors) [82] matcher, and then evaluating
quality of matches using a standard approach based on ratio of feature distances [72]
as described here. For every keypoint ki in ROIenroll, we find its two closest (in
feature distance) keypoints (k′1 and k
′
2) from ROIverify and compute from their Eu-
clidean distance in feature space a ratio score ri =
‖ki−k′1‖2
‖ki−k′2‖2 . A low ratio indicates that
keypoint ki is significantly more similar to its best match k
′
1 than to its second best
match k′2, which implies that ki and k
′
1 are likely to be corresponding points in the two
images [72]. The 50 keypoint pairs with the lowest ratios (i.e., the best matches) are
used as the basis for estimating a homography with the RANSAC algorithm. Increas-
ing the number of matches will reduce the chance of RANSAC reaching consensus
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on an incorrect homography, but increases the expected number of random samples
required to find consensus.
RANSAC (Random Sample Consensus) [38] is an algorithm to estimate a model
from noisy data that contains both inliers and outliers. In our case, the computed
model is the homography, and the data are the 50 selected keypoint pairs. RANSAC
first samples four keypoint pairs from the set and calculates from them a homography
matrix as in Eq. 5.1, where the 3x3 matrix is the homography, and Pe and Pv are the
respective coordinates in enrollment and verification images of the keypoints. The
quality of the homography model is then evaluated according to how many of the 50
keypoint pairs fit the model. Each pair that fits the homography model is considered
an inlier. The process iterates to calculate and evaluate homographies from different
sample points, and the homography with the highest number of inliers is returned as
the best fit for the data.
Pv =

h11 h12 h13
h21 h22 h23
h31 h32 1
× Pe (5.1)
5.3.3.2 Projection and Scoring
Using the enrollment and verification keypoints, and the homography between
them, we compute a score that indicates how many of the enrolled keypoints have
good matches in the set of verification keypoints. An enrolled keypoint is considered to
have a good match if there exists a verification keypoint that satisfies two conditions:
(1) it is highly similar to the enrolled keypoint, and (2) it is at the position where
the enrolled keypoint should be found in the verification image. The first condition
is formalized as a requirement of being the nearest neighbor in feature space to the
enrolled keypoint. The second condition is formalized as a requirement of being within
2 pixels of the location where the homography predicts the enrolled keypoint to be in
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Figure 5.5: Pixel distance between the expected location of a keypoint (according to
homography) and the location of its nearest neighbor in feature space. The spike at
left shows points for which the nearest neighbor is found in the expected location.
The points that are sufficiently close to be counted as inliers are the ones colored red.
the verification image. This ensures that matched features are not only similar, but
also geometrically consistent with relative positions of the enrolled keypoints. Fig. 5.5
shows the pixel distance between the homography projection of an enrolled keypoint
and the location of the verification keypoint that is its nearest neighbor in feature
space. The data is collected from 100 different verification trials. The peak at left
indicates that the nearest neighbor is often found within two pixels of the location
predicted by the homography. These points are the inliers.
Fig. 5.6 shows examples of keypoint matching from verification. The matching
succeeds even when the verification image is rotated and at a different scale from
the orientation of the same chip at enrollment. Each line on the figure shows the
correspondence between an enrolled keypoint and a matching keypoint found on the
package during verification.
5.4 Evaluation
We evaluate the CounterFoil system using experiments on populations of two
plastic dual in-line package (PDIP) chips. The first is an Alliance Memory AS6C6264-
55PCN [7], which is a 64kb SRAM in a 28-pin PDIP (surface size 35.6mm × 15.2mm)
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(a) Verification at nominal ori-
entation
(b) Verification with rotation (c) Verification at different scale
Figure 5.6: Three examples of matching between enrollment keypoints (square in
upper left) and verification image of the same chip package instance, where the ver-
ification image differs in zoom and orientation. White square on chip package is the
identified region of interest for verification. Each line corresponds to a keypoint match
from enrollment to verification (Sec. 5.3.3.2).
that is rated for 0◦C to 70◦C temperature range. The second is a Microchip Tech-
nology 23LC1024 [80], which is a 1Mb SRAM in an 8-pin PDIP (9.2mm × 6.4mm)
that is rated for −40◦C to 85◦C. Images are collected using two instances of two
different camera models. The two ViTiny UM12 cameras [113] cost $390 each, have
5MP sensors, and computer-controlled focus through software. The two MustCam
UM012C cameras cost $40 each, have 5MP sensors, and manual focus by turning a
dial. Our collection of chips and cameras are shown in Fig 5.7.
In our evaluation we use 52 instances of chip model AS6C6264 and 40 instances
of chip model 23LC1024. Chips packaged in the same mold are identified by the
mold marking on the package. Our dataset has several chips packaged from the
same mold: 5 pairs, 9 multiples in chip model AS6C6264 and 14 pairs in chip model
23LC1024. Each chip instance is enrolled to the database using one camera, and then
verified using the other camera of the same model. Enrollment and verification is
repeated 3 times for each chip, comprising a total of 528 images taken with ViTiny
and MustCam.
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Figure 5.7: Experimental setup. Left side of workbench used for enrollment, right
side used for verification. Separate camera are used for enrollment and verification.
Middle of image shows the population of chips with labels affixed.
5.4.1 Package Authentication
Package authentication is performed by matching verification image features with
enrolled ones as described in Sec. 5.3. Fig. 5.8 shows in green the cumulative distri-
bution function (CDF) of the number of inliers (matched keypoints) from the dataset
of enrolled and verification chip images using our system. Fig. 5.8 also shows in red
the CDF of inliers for mislabeled packages. In these cases, the program is modified to
ignore the identity encoded on the label, and to fetch from the database the enrolled
keypoints of another, randomly selected chip instance of the same model. 5,000 such
comparisons are performed. This CDF represents what a counterfeiter might achieve
by randomly swapping labels. We also consider the strongest counterfeiter that has
an exact duplicate of the mold used to produce the enrolled chip, and he copies the
label for the legitimate enrolled chip onto his counterfeits created from the same mold.
The lines in blue show the number of inliers that the counterfeit would be able to
achieve in this permissive setting. Even if the attacker has the same mold used to
produce an enrolled chip, the counterfeits that can be created with the mold typically
still have significantly fewer inliers than the enrolled chip.
The verifier’s decision to accept or reject a package is made according to whether
the number of matched enrollment keypoints exceeds a threshold. A higher thresh-
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Figure 5.8: CDF of number of inliers using each model of camera.
old is a more selective determination of authenticity. Higher thresholds reduce false
positives (counterfeit chips being accepted as authentic), but can also reduce true
positives (legitimate chips being accepted as authentic). Receiver operating charac-
teristic (ROC) curves are plots that show the achievable tradeoffs between excluding
false positives and keeping true positives. An ROC curve is created by sweeping the
acceptance threshold, and at each threshold value evaluating the number of true and
false positives. A true positive always refers to a case where the enrolled and verified
chip are the same instance with the same label, but we use two different notions of a
103
0.0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.0
False Positive Rate
0.0
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.0
T
ru
e 
P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
From Different Mold 
(AUC=1.0)
From Same Mold 
(AUC=0.997)
(a) 23LC1024 with ViTiny
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Figure 5.9: Receiver Operating Characteristic curves show ability to distinguish en-
rolled chips from other chips created from a different mold than the enrolled chip, or
from the same mold that produced the enrolled chip.
false positive. The first case is when the chip being verified is a counterfeit that differs
from its labeled identity, and the identity on the label is not enrolled to a chip from
the same mold as the counterfeit. The second case is when the counterfeit chip has a
label used to enroll another chip from the same mold as itself. The ROC curves are
shown in Fig. 5.9. For both models of chip and both models of camera, we are able to
distinguish perfectly (100% true positives at 0% false positives) between a legitimate
chip being verified and a counterfeit chip that is created from a different mold. Even
in the extreme case where the counterfeiter has the same mold (from the packaging
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house) used to create the enrolled chip, it is possible to detect the counterfeits while
still keeping a high rate of true positives. The worst case is AS6C6264 with ViTiny
camera (Fig. 5.9b), where it is still possible to accept 90% of legitimate chips while
rejecting 90% of counterfeits that are created from the exact same mold. We will show
later in the paper that this performance can be further improved by higher quality
images.
5.4.2 Runtime
Verifying provenance of packages should not slow manufacturing (for enroller) or
integration (for verifier). The verification process is more computationally intensive
than enrollment, and certain target applications for verification may impose stringent
latency requirements. For example, we envision that one application is integration
with a pick-and-place machine, which removes chips from feeder reels and places them
appropriately onto printed circuit board pads for reflow soldering. Single head pick-
and-place machines from a leading manufacturer place between 1,800 and 5,000 parts
per hour [76], which corresponds to handling each part for 720ms to 2s. Fig. 5.10
shows that package verification can be performed at production speed, as our system
is able to authenticate each instance within 150 ms on an Intel Xeon CPU E5-2690.
The runtime can be further reduced to meet even tighter latency requirements by
enrolling a smaller number keypoints for each chip. Fig. 5.10 shows how runtime
scales with the size of ROI at a constant keypoint density, and shows the breakdown
of runtime according to image processing function.
5.4.3 Practicality and Costs
The CounterFoil methodology is compatible as an add-on to existing supply
chains, and the cost at scale should be significantly less than one cent per chip.
Chip verifiers can use the inexpensive camera models from our experiments, and
perform processing on dedicated or shared computers. Given that verification would
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Figure 5.10: Runtime of verification procedure, broken down by processing task, for
different sizes of ROI. Keypoint density is held constant at 1,000/mm2. The increase
in keypoints for the larger ROI results in a higher runtime, but also increases the
number of matching points that are found. Runtime can be traded against accuracy
by adjusting the ROI size.
likely be performed at PCB assembly houses, the small cost of the camera would be
insignificant, especially when amortized over a large number of boards being produced.
The labels affixed to the chips cost $0.30 per sheet, and we print 1024 markers per
sheet, for a per-unit cost of $0.0003 per label. The enrolled data for each chip is 1
MB, which at current hard-drive prices of $0.03 per GB corresponds to a per-unit
cost of $0.00003 for storing the data. Affixing markers to each chip is currently a
manual and time-consuming process. At scale we imagine that per-chip labels could
be replaced by labels on part reels, or other ways of communicating a purported
identity for the parts that would be used to access the signed enrollment records.
In that case, the ROI would be identified based on image recognition of package
surface instead of the markers. The low barriers to adoption of CounterFoil are
simply convincing a packaging house to deploy this technology, and establishing keys
for signing and verifying chips. Even if only a small fraction of purchasers would
106
Table 5.1: Quantitative comparison of different feature-detecting methods. Plot at
right shows the ROC plot from which the area-under-curve is computed. All four
algorithms are configured to use 1,000 keypoints per mm2 for this comparison.
Algorithm
Avg. Inliers Area
Under
Curve
Run
Time [s]Same
Chip
Same
Mold
SIFT 570 178 0.971 0.215
SURF 470 100 0.970 0.211
ORB 236 56 0.980 0.064
BRISK 215 53 0.953 0.432 0.0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.0
False Positive Rate
0.0
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.0
T
ru
e 
P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
SIFT
SURF
ORB
BRISK
verify their chips using the available information, this should increase the risk of
detection for distributors that traffic in possible counterfeits. The more significant
barrier to adoption is perhaps the possibility that superficial cosmetic damage to parts
could cause them to become untrusted, representing a monetary loss and a harm to
branding.
5.4.4 Algorithm Difference
Tab. 5.1 compares the runtime and authentication performance of four popular
algorithms for feature extraction and matching. While all of the algorithms are
suitable, we find ORB to perform best, and have thus chosen it for our work. In
particular, the speedup of ORB comes largely from its compatibility of using locality-
based hashing to identify near neighbors, without using the k-nearest neighbor search
which is the most time consuming operation in the other algorithms.
5.4.5 Camera Differences
Because enrollment and verification are performed using different camera in-
stances, ability to match features may be impacted by differences in the lens, lighting,
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Figure 5.11: Histograms showing increase in number of inliers in AS6C6264 SRAM
when same ViTiny cameras are used for both enrollment and verification.
or the sensor array [73] of the cameras. To explore this further, we now evaluate
how the matching performance changes in the unrealistic scenario of using the same
ViTiny camera instance for both enrollment and verification of AS6C6264 chips, which
was the most challenging authentication case in the prior experiments (see Fig 5.9b).
Fig. 5.11 shows that using a consistent camera causes the number of inliers to increase,
both in the case of same-chip comparisons and same-mold comparisons. The same-
chip comparisons have a larger increase, and the overlap between the two distributions
is reduced, implying capability for better authentication performance. This result re-
veals the presence of some detrimental camera variations that are being overcome in
our realistic authentications that use different camera instances for verification and
enrollment.
5.4.6 Varying Magnification and Lighting
Fig. 5.12 shows results under different magnification and lighting conditions using
the ViTiny camera with the AS6C6264 chips using a smaller dataset with 10 chip
instances. The approach is largely unaffected by lighting changes, but changing the
magnification from enrollment to verification has some impact on the number of
inliers.
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Figure 5.12: Histogram of inliers in AS6C6264 SRAM under two alternative lighting
intensities (nominal is 800 lux) and one alternative zoom.
5.5 Further Investigation of Fingerprints
In this section we deviate from our standard system to investigate package fin-
gerprint properties that cannot easily be evaluated within the overall system. In
particular, for different reasons, experiments in this section define the ROI in a way
that doesn’t rely on affixed labels. Instead of defining the center of the ROI as being
at position < r, θ > relative to the marker (see Fig. 5.4), the center of the ROI is here
defined as a pixel in the center of the image. To ensure that the same area of the
chip is always imaged, the chip is aligned carefully to the camera. Aside from lacking
markers, the image processing performed is as described in Sec. 5.3.
5.5.1 Testing Resilience of Fingerprints
The fingerprints should be robust enough to withstand wear that occurs when IC
packages are jostled and handled during distribution. We use various time durations
in a hobbyist rock tumbler to impart controllable amounts of wear on chips. After
enrollment, chips are placed alone in the rock tumbler with 45mL of water and 5g of
60-grit silicon carbide, which is the coarsest grit used in rock tumbling. The tumbler
barrel is washed out between experiments, and each trial uses new grit and clean
water. After tumbling, the chip is removed, rinsed under a faucet, dried and imaged
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for verification. The prototype adhesive labels do not survive the rock tumbler, so
the ROI in the images is instead found by careful alignment of the chip under the
camera.
Fig. 5.13 shows the degradation in number of inliers for chips after different
amounts of time in the tumbler. The plot shows a slow decrease in the number of
inliers after tumbling with a few hundred inliers left after an hour in the tumbler.
The dashed line on the plot shows the acceptance threshold that has a 95 percent
probability of rejecting a different chip from the same mold. In other words, an
attacker that has obtained the same mold and produced new chips from it will have
only a 5% of exceeding this threshold and thereby succeeding in forgery. Even after
significant wear, most authentication trials from the legitimate chip are able to exceed
this value.
Figs. 5.13b and 5.13c show package surfaces before and after 1 hour in the tumbler.
Note that these images are illustrative; they use a different magnification from the
results in Fig. 5.13a and include the corners of the chip where the wear is most
noticeable, instead of showing only the ROI where the wear is less apparent. We
also tested the effect of temperature by heating the chips to 170◦C for an hour in a
thermal chamber, but saw no change in the number of inliers.
5.5.2 Testing Fingerprint Uniqueness
Any complex physical object has some combination of minute features that are
unlike all other instances of the same object. Given that molded integrated circuit
packages are heterogeneous mixtures of particles, they are certain to be unique in this
trivial, physical, sense. However, for authentication the relevant question is whether
there is a uniqueness that is observable and stable at the scale of our imaging. In
studying uniqueness, we pay special attention to chips that are produced from the
same mold. Fortunately, each chip bears a mold mark that is imprinted in a circle on
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Figure 5.13: Reduction in inliers for chip AS6C6264 after spending time in rock
tumbler. Images of chip are included to give a sense of the amount of wear caused.
the underside of the chip. The mold mark, as is visible in Fig. 5.13b, gives a code of
one letter and two numbers. The marks are used for traceability within the packaging
facility, so that problematic molds can be identified. Our experiments confirm that
chips with the same mark are from the same mold, as they show a distinct similarity
according to our analysis, and in fact a similar texture can be observed at high
magnification.
5.5.2.1 Scoring under Controlled Alignment
Experiments that use imprecisely placed labels to define the ROI of each chip
cannot definitively show whether package fingerprints are unique. Two packages that
are identical would appear unique if their labels are placed in such a way that their
ROIs are disjoint regions of the package surface. We again avoid relying on markers
and perform experiments in which ROI is based on chip alignment underneath the
camera. Fig. 5.14 shows the result. Different chip instances from the same mold do
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Figure 5.14: Inlier CDFs for SRAMs under controlled alignment.
show similarity, but it is smaller than the similarity between two images of the same
chip. In chip type AS6C6264, the highest score between any two images of different
chips from the same mold is 277 inliers, whereas the lowest score between any two
images of the same chip is 603 inliers; the means are 113 and 825 respectively. The
clear difference in scores for same-mold and same-chip comparisons is significant, as
it shows that the mold surface texture is not entirely responsible for the fingerprints.
Even if an adversary were able to perfectly reproduce (or steal) the mold, they will
be unable to create high quality forged packages with it.
5.5.2.2 PUF-like evaluation using Pixel Intensity
We also consider evaluating similarity of package fingerprints using a standard
Physically Unclonable Function(PUF)-like scheme rather than the computer vision
based techniques used in CounterFoil. As standard PUF metrics [75, 74] based on
Hamming distance are not directly applicable in this setting, distance comparisons
between enrollment and verification images are made by comparing the 8-bit pixel
intensities of the two ROIs on a pixel-by-pixel basis, which is analogous to comparing
responses from weak PUFs on a bit-by-bit basis.
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Figure 5.15: PUF-like evaluation on raw pixel intensity data.
The major challenge in making this comparison is that, unlike in digital PUFs,
when comparing images there is no ground truth about which pixel in the verifica-
tion image should be compared against which pixel in the enrollment image. Even if
the package appears identical in the two images, the pixel-by-pixel comparison will
only show the similarity if the two images have pixel-accurate alignment. Aside from
requiring pixel-accurate alignment in the X and Y directions, rotation and scale vari-
ance additionally cannot be tolerated. Still, with some difficulty, we can partially
overcome these challenges to make a pixel-by-pixel comparison. To make the com-
parison, we start from images taken using controlled alignment. A bruteforce search
is then performed to find the X and Y offset that best aligns the images, as seen
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in Fig. 5.15b. Only when the alignment is correct to within a few pixels does the
similarity between the images become apparent. The need to perform brute force
search for alignment increases runtime to 10s per comparison, which is hundreds of
times slower than CounterFoil, and still unable to handle any change to rotation
or scale. The results from making hundreds of comparisons in this manner are shown
in Fig. 5.15a. In some cases, presumably due to rotation or scale, the similarity be-
tween the same-chip images cannot be found using pixel-by-pixel comparisons. This
result confirms that the package features can with some difficulty be observed in a
PUF like way, but also shows that pixel-by-pixel comparisons are not well-suited to
this task relative to the computer vision approach.
5.5.2.3 PUF-like evaluation using Feature Distance
In CounterFoil, the number of matches that we compute as inliers is based on
both feature similarity, and the geometric relationship of the features on the pack-
age surface, as matched keypoints from enrollment and verification must be related
by a homography. One might also consider evaluating similarity of the features in
corresponding positions of two chip packages, similar to Hamming Distance between
corresponding bits in a PUF circuit. In this case, the computer vision approach is
being used to align the enrollment and verification keypoints, but after alignment is
decided the corresponding features are scored according to their similarity in feature
space instead of their pixel intensity.
Fig. 5.16 shows the average distance, in feature space, between features having
positional correspondence defined by computed homography. In a highly controlled
setting of careful alignment, lighting and single camera, the same package can be
distinguished from packages created from the same mold, as shown by the separation
between the feature distances in Fig. 5.16a. However, in the general setting which
contains typical image quality variations, the same chip distribution is shifted to
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Figure 5.16: Average distance in feature space for same-position keypoint pairs.
the right leading to a slight overlap with the same mold distribution as shown in
Fig. 5.16a. An absolute feature distance threshold to distinguish between chips from
same mold is therefore not robust to image quality variations. CounterFoil aims
to avoid this limitation by using feature similarity ranking (nearest neighbors) instead
of an absolute distance threshold.
5.5.3 Additional Package Types
To further validate package surface fingerprints, we conduct experiments with
10 additional types of circuit packages. As before, one ViTiny camera is used for
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Figure 5.17: Evaluation of package surface fingerprints across a range of package
types.
enrollment, and a second for verification. We use 5 instances of each chip, and from
each instance collect 5 enrollment and 5 verification images. Note that, among the
molded packages in this secondary population, we don’t have any chips that appear
to be from the same mold.
Fig. 5.17 summarizes the results of the experiment. Because many of the packages
are quite small, and we want to use an unmarked area of the package surface as the
fingerprint, in some cases the enrolled area of the surface is smaller than 2mm2. ROI
is identified by manual chip alignment under the camera, as many of the packages
are impractically small for the crude adhesive markers used in our prototype demon-
stration. The table gives for each chip an example image with the ROI marked by a
square. To give a sense of the surface structure of each package model, we plot within
the table the deviation from nominal surface height along an arbitrary 0.9mm trace
of the surface; this data is collected with the same Zygo Nexview 3D optical surface
profiler used to generate Fig. 5.3a.
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The significant distance between the average number of inliers for same chip and
different chip comparisons implies that it may be possible to authenticate most of the
plastic packages by their fingerprints, although further experiments would be needed
to give confidence. Interestingly, based on this preliminary data, the ceramic package
(14-CDIP) also appears to be highly identifiable. Two packages that are notably
unsuitable for the style of package fingerprinting used in this paper are the final
two entries in the table – the TO-39 metal can package and 20-WLCSP wafer-level
package. In these two cases, the reflective surfaces cause very few keypoints to be
extracted from the image, and the extracted keypoints do not match well between
enrollment and verification.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter we have presented CounterFoil, a system that verifies prove-
nance by extracting unique fingerprints from surface features of integrated circuit
packages imaged using inexpensive cameras. The work is a low-cost strategy that
can help to address the significant problem of counterfeit integrated circuits which
results in billions of dollars of losses each year. Our approach enrolls unique features
of each chip during packaging, and requires no chain-of-custody. During verification
features are matched against cryptographically signed enrollment records. We’ve
demonstrated the approach to work on a large population of two different chips, have
used different models of low-cost microscope cameras, and have evaluated resiliency
of fingerprints. Crucially, we’ve shown that even an adversary possessing an exact
duplicate of the mold used to produce a chip’s package will not be able to create a
high-quality counterfeit of the chip.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
In this thesis we have addressed the important problem of security of ICs in the IoT
application space, with a specific focus on block ciphers. When implementing block
ciphers there is a choice of implementation style depending on design and resource
constraints. For low latency requirements, our Combinational Checkpointing scheme
(Ch. 2) is shown to be the most efficient way to implement unrolled implementations
of block ciphers but the 2-10x area costs of unrolling are unappealing. In low area
implementations, our novel lightweight AES architecture (Ch. 3) based on register
renaming greatly reduces inefficiencies in data movement and clocking, making it
twice as efficient as state-of-the-art. Side channel resilience is also improved by adding
shuffling capability to randomize sub-round operations of the AES algorithm. We
successfully taped out our designs in a commercial 16nm FinFET technology (Ch. 4)
and at 0.55 pJ/bit our renaming architecture is to the best of our knowledge the most
efficient one to date, making it an attractive candidate for low power applications.
We also present a novel cost-effective methodology, denoted as CounterFoil,
to tackle the serious problem of IC counterfeiting (Ch. 5). CounterFoil leverages
the variability in IC packaging to extract unique fingerprints from package surface
texture and uses them to verify chip provenance. Our technique is shown to work with
different types of plastic packages and is resilient to imaging conditions and, to some
degree, wear-and-tear. The low cost and ease of integration make CounterFoil a
compelling solution to ensure supply chain security.
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